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ABSTRACT 
The intention of this thesis is to determine the warning signals and preventive actions to 
conduct the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process successfully. Although Colombia has 
experienced multiple DDR processes during its recent history, political violence 
continues to plague the country. After each process, Colombia notes the mutation of 
criminal structures, which have deployed their tentacles to other Latin American 
countries. Understanding the salient issues that led to the success or failure of DDR 
processes will aid the Government of Colombia (GOC) in continuing to face the process 
with FARC. 
The main argument of this thesis is that, in order for DDR to be successful, the 
GOC must take the “best practices” of the DDR into account, not only in Colombia, but 
in other countries. Due to similarities with DDR experiences and the Colombian conflict, 
El Salvador and South Africa are the selected countries. This thesis also will cover past 
Colombian experiences in DDR, beginning with the end of La Violencia and ending with 
the DDR of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), as well as the 
“individual demobilization” programs for insurgents. An analysis of these cases will 
provide the best approaches for conducting a successful DDR process with FARC. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has become one of the 
most contentious, complex, and difficult to implement aspects of post-war conflict 
resolution. If a conflict ends short of total victory for one side and the destruction or 
surrender of the defeated force, then a process to disarm the combatants and reintegrate 
them as productive members of society who accept the political outcome of the conflict 
must inevitably follow. Otherwise, the peace-building strategy may become irrevocably 
compromised, the conflict may reignite, or at the very least, an irreconcilable faction may 
continue to imperil the security environment. DDR has become a central feature of all 
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations since in 1990s. They have generally been 
considered successful in places like El Salvador, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, less 
successful in the Balkans in the 1990s, and with mixed results in Nepal and South Africa. 
DDR requires several elements for success: 1) an end to hostilities—a negotiated 
political outcome acceptable to all parties; 2) the participation of all belligerents in the 
process; and, 3) adequate resources not only to implement and monitor the DDR process, 
but also to reintegrate former combatants into society. The failure to reintegrate former 
belligerents is considered the “Achilles heel” of DDR.1 DDR has become increasingly 
complicated in the last decade because of the increasing numbers of female and child 
combatants in insurgent groups, who require special and more focused programs.  
Colombia has experienced a long history of internal conflict and reconciliation. At 
the time of writing, the Government of Colombia (GOC) is engaged in negotiations with 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) in 
Havana, Cuba. Within the peace process, the parties have reached an agreement over the 
first three items of the agenda: the drug trafficking problem, the distribution and use of 
land, and the political participation of minority groups in Colombia. The last two points 
1 Stephanie Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, February 16, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/world/disarmament-demobilization-reintegration-ddr-
africa/p12650. 
 1 
                                                 
allegedly provoked the FARC’s uprising more than 60 years ago. Because of this initial 
progress and because of the GOC’s success in beating back the FARC challenge, many 
analysts dare to predict that the end of the prolonged war in Colombia is near. 
Assuming the peace negotiations are successful, the objective of this thesis is to 
answer the question, what are the most salient issues to be faced by the GOC in the 
subsequent DDR process? Answering this question will be a complicated process on 
several levels. First, as a decentralized organization, will all FARC “fronts” accept the 
outcome of the process? Second, what might the process to disarm the insurgents look 
like? In other words, one of the great reasons is that insurgents are reluctant to disarm for 
fear of retaliation. Therefore, the experience of some countries, like El Salvador and 
South Africa, might offer interesting mechanisms for “confidence building.” Finally, on 
the issue of reintegration, the GOC will be faced with the task of providing a meaningful 
livelihood for largely illiterate groups of former peasants whose only experience is 
conflict and criminal activity. In addition, FARC ranks contain a high percentage—
perhaps as many as half in some regions—of women and children. How are they to be 
handled?  
Experience from other nations may be instructive. But Colombia is no stranger to 
DDR. This process began with the end of La Violencia, the period of civil war between 
Liberals and Conservatives that lasted a decade from 1948 to 1958, through the 
demobilization of M-19 in the late 1980s. Both of these demobilizations required 
significant political compromises, including changes in the constitution and even the 
reintegration of former insurgent groups into the political process. A final DDR process 
occurred between 2003 and 2006 when the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a 
loose coalition of paramilitary forces that materialized in the 1990s ostensibly to combat 
the growing influence of left-wing groups in the country; but which had a strong criminal 
element, were demobilized during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe. While at the time this 
was considered a success, in retrospect, there appears to have been much skullduggery, 
deception, and side-deals that led many of these paramilitary groups to continue to exist 
as BACRIM (the acronym for criminal bands in Spanish), engaging in drug trafficking, 
sometimes in cooperation with their enemy, the FARC, but also in extortion and 
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kidnapping. Since 2002, the GOC has also run an individual demobilization and 
reintegration program for deserters from guerrilla ranks, which also contains lessons.  
DDR is important because not only is the reconstruction of Colombian society at 
stake after 60 years of conflict, but also the stability of South America’s northern tier. 
From its own history of demobilization processes, can Bogotá promote DDR with FARC 
that will facilitate full integration of its members into society, and avert the risks of 
renegade elements consolidating power and influence in certain regions, in this way 
creating yet another transnational criminal gang in Latin America? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Since the signing of the Plan Colombia between the Governments of the United 
States and Colombia in 2000,2 the Andean country became the third largest recipient of 
U.S. military aid behind Israel and Egypt.3 At first, that aid was directed to support the 
fight against the traffic in illicit drugs; however, in the wake of September 11, 2001, the 
U.S. Congress expanded the mandate to allow the funds to be used to support the fight 
against the terrorist organizations like the FARC. The reason was clear to both 
governments—the direct participation of the FARC and other organizations in the 
business of drug trafficking to finance their terrorist actions. 
A successful DDR process of the FARC would lead to the disappearance of one 
of the largest drug cartels in Colombia, as well as a serious reduction in the crimes of 
human trafficking and drugs.4 The long-standing involvement of the United States with 
Colombia obviously gives Washington a stake in the outcome of the peace talks and the 
successful implementation of any agreement that flowed from it. Because the FARC 
maintains links with illegal organizations, and operates in Paraguay, Ecuador, Peru, 
2 Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report (CRS Report No. 32774) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, February 17, 2005), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573962.pdf. 
3 Adam Isacson, Joy Olson, and Lisa Haugaard, “Below the Radar: U.S. Military Programs with Latin 
America, 1997–2007,” March 25, 2010, http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/27932. 
4 Daniel Pécaut in his essay estimates that money from drugs trafficking represents among 50 to 70 
percent of FARC’s income. Daniel Pécaut, “Las FARC: Fuentes de su Longevidad y de la Conservación 
De su Cohesión,” [The FARC: Sources of their Longevity and the Conservation of its Cohesion], Análisis 
Político 63 (May–August 2008), 22–50. http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/20925.pdf, 38. 
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Brazil and Chile, a successful cessation of hostilities, followed by a comprehensive DDR 
process, will provide a relief for the police and intelligence communities of those 
countries. It would also realize one of the main objectives of Plan Colombia, which was 
to “help Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to 
regional security in the Andes.”5 
After more than 60 years of bloody internal conflict that has resulted in hundreds 
of thousands deaths and literally millions of refugees in Colombia, peace now seems 
within reach. However, the consolidation of peace requires a successful DDR process. 
This requires institutionalizing the lessons and best practices not only of Colombia’s 
recent past, but also those of other nations. Successful peace and DDR would allow 
Colombia, which at present spends almost 6.5 percent of its GDP on war, to make 
infrastructure and social investments.6 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the elimination of a forty-year superpower 
competition caused a renewed emphasis on resolving regional tensions that previously 
had been interpreted in a zero-sum Cold War context.7 However, it soon became clear 
that the mere signing of a peace agreement offered an insufficient guarantee of a stable 
peace. In order to achieve this overall goal, former combatants had to be disarmed and 
reintegrated into society. Since the end of the Cold War, the common denominator for 
successful conflict termination, followed by a sustainable peace at the end of civil war or 
5 Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report, 6. 
6 Salomón Kalmanovitz, “El Impacto Economico Del Conflicto Interno Colombiano Y Un Escenario 
De Paz,” [The Economic Impact of the Colombian Internal Conflict and a Scenario of Peace], United 




7 Marc W. Chernick, “Las Dimensiones Internacionales De Los Conflictos Internos En América 
Latina: De La Guerra Fría (a La Paz Negociada En Centroamérica) a La Guerra Antinarcótica,” [The 
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict in Latin America: From The Cold War (to a negotiated peace 
in Central America) to the Antinarcotic War], Colombia Internacional, Revista No 41 (April–March 1998), 
http://colombiainternacional.uniandes.edu.co/view.php/324/index.php?id=324. 
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protracted violence, has been an effective DDR process.8 DDR has taken many forms, 
some more successful than others. While it remains clear that there is no generic DDR 
formula applicable across conflicts, which generate their own dynamics, practices, and 
procedures, the study of this process can be used to warn of potential pitfalls in future 
DDR implementation.  
According to the UN, “The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to 
security and stability in post- conflict environments so that recovery and development can 
begin.”9 Likewise, in From Insurgency to Stability, the authors argue that DDR’s 
objective “is to consolidate the transition (from peace to war) by ensuring the full 
reintegration of ex-combatants into a civilian setting.”10 Thus, it is clear if the DDR 
process ends in failure, the peace process is put at risk. Albert Caramés and Eneko Sanz 
reinforce this idea by stating that DDR breakdown can be “the reason for new 
hostilities.”11 
Once the objectives of DDR are established, one should explore the full range of 
options in the DDR process. In their book, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Nat Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer note that there are 
two types of DDR. The first one occurs after the victory of one of the conflict’s actors 
and the utter defeat of his opponents, in which case the DDR is hardly to be negotiated.12 
The second type occurs when neither side gains a clear victory but is locked in what 
8 See among others, a United Nations (UN) report about “Overview DDR processes in Africa,” June 
2007; Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) “Short Course on Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration,” March 30–April 2, 2008; Albert Caramés and Eneko Sanz, report entitled “Analysis of 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs in the world during 2007, 2008; Antonio 
Giustozzi, book entitled “Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 20. 
9 United Nations, “Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration,” Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration, (2006), http://img.static.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
6006A636E254D809C125750D0036A0D4-UN_sep2006.pdf 
10 Angel Rabasa et al., From Insurgency to Stability: Volume I: Key Capabilities and Practices (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 51, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1111z1.html. 
11 Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas, and Eneko Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2005,” Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace 
(2006), 5, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. 
12 Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Directions in Development series (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), 1. 
5 
scholars call “a mutually hurting stalemate.”13 A compromise peace, often brokered by 
an outside player,14 offers the optimal compromise, in which case the combatants must 
come to an arrangement to lay down their arms.15 
Because the DDR process must adapt to the situation on the ground, experts 
generally agree that, “DDR is not a clean three-step process.”16 It is necessary to 
understand that these processes take time and must not be rushed.17 Nevertheless, it falls 
on states or international organizations to monitor each stage of the DDR process to 
insure within the best of their abilities a successful outcome.  
Disarmament is the first stage of the process. If this occurs early in the DDR 
process and the weapons used during the conflict are destroyed, then DDR sends a strong 
political message of compromise by both parties. According to Mark Knight and 
Alpaslan Ozerdem, “by disarming, the combatants are forging a new social contract with 
the government and the international community.”18 The resulting message can become 
one of compromise and peace to the indigenous population as well as to the international 
community. Likewise, disarmament can contribute to future security and stability.19 
Several scholars argue that the second stage—demobilization—includes two 
modalities. “Demobilization may take place at temporary locations or at larger, semi-
permanent camps called cantonments.”20 Demobilization also requires reduction or 
reform of state’s army following peace agreements, which happened in El Salvador, 
13 United Nations, Overview: DDR Processes in Africa (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo: 
United Nations, 2007), 9, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/DDR_Kinshasa_Final.pdf. 
14 Ibid., 8. 
15 Colletta et al., The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6. 
16 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” The 
Washington Quarterly 25:4 (Autumn 2002): 51, http://muse.jhu.edu/
login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.4feil.html. 
17 Caramés, Fisas, and Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
Programmes in the World during 2005,” 5. 
18 Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4 
(July 2004), 506, http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/41/4/499.full.pdf+html. 
19 United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” United Nations, 2005, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/DDR_retrospective.pdf. 
20 United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” 10. 
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Nicaragua, and South Africa. It is very important to note that, “identifying who belongs 
to an armed group and thus is eligible for demobilization and reintegration can be a 
challenging process.”21 It is not enough for any alleged combatant to demonstrate that he 
is eligible for DDR merely by the fact that he or she is armed. Instead, the DDR 
implementers must consider a broader criterion for eligibility into such programs, such as 
membership in a group.22  
The third stage corresponds to Reintegration, which according to the UN, “is the 
process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment 
and income.”23 The reintegration phase is an important part of the development and 
reconstruction of the post-war society. For this reason, it must be a long-term 
commitment for the country.24 The United Nations in its report “DDR in Peace 
Operations: A Retrospective” notes that this stage is an open time-frame process with the 
support, in several cases, of external actors.25  
According to Nicole Ball and Luc van der Goor, DDR has four guiding principles 
to fulfill in order to succeed.26 First, the “DDR processes should be built on the 
foundation of national leadership and responsibility.”27 It is necessary to keep in mind 
that the model is not a rigid one imposition by any particular multilateral organism, but 
rather is a “national[ly] owned”28 process. The DDR process is not a generic prescription 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Albert Caramés and Eneko Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) Programmes in the World during 2007,” Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace (2008), 9, 
http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr005i.pdf. 
25 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) “Short Course on Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration,” March 30–April 2, 2008, 11; Caramés and Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in the World during 2007, 2008,” 27; United Nations 
(UN) “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” September 2010, 4. 
26 Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Mapping 
Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit (Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, 2006), 7, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/
20060800_cru_paper_ddr.pdf. 
27 Ibid. 
28 United Nations, “Briefing Notes for Senior Managers on the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 4. 
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given by the UN, or any other organization, that can be applied to any country coming 
out of a protracted conflict. Second, “DDR should be approached as a process, not a 
program.”29 DDR is not a set of linear activities that execute consecutively. On the 
contrary, it is a process, which although complex, must develop into a parallel and agile 
way between its different stages. Third, “DDR should be viewed as part of a broader 
security, stabilization and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention.”30 
This point includes, among others aspects, “the relevance of financial reinsertion 
assistance”31 to former combatants. Without the appropriate funding to carry out a 
comprehensive reinsertion program of the former guerrillas, militias, or even armed 
forces, there is a big risk that can emerge from insecurity and instability in the country 
during the DDR process.  
Fourth, “all DDR stakeholders—national, regional, and international—should 
make a serious effort to learn from past experiences.”32 The DDR processes differ from 
one country to other, and adjust to the political moment during which they are executed. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that successful DDR missions possess common 
characteristics, which must be integrated into the planning and initiation of new DDR 
processes. 
As a consequence of the fourth principle, and to guide multiple peace missions 
around the world, what scholars have referred to as second generation DDR began around 
2010. According to Ayaka Suzuki, head of the UN’s DDR Department, “second 
generation” became a “term to describe the emerging practices in various peace 
operations around the world.”33 The “second generation” recognized that, despite the 
29 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Knight and Ozerdem, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of 
Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,” 499. 
32 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
33 United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” 15. 
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successes achieved in the past (e.g., El Salvador and Nicaragua), it is necessary 
constantly to revise and update the DDR model. 
In its report, “Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR): Practices in Peace Operations,” the UN notes that it is necessary to take three 
groups of measures in order to improve DDR processes. First, “post-conflict stabilization 
measures of effectiveness (MOE) include emergency employment programs, reinsertion 
programs, and sub-national/community approaches.”34 
Second, “targeting specific groups with different approaches and incentives, 
includes disarmament and dismantlement of militias, commanders and senior officers 
incentive programs, at-risk youth and gang programs, pension schemes, and psychosocial 
recovery strategies.”35 If it is evident that there are significant numbers of children and 
women combatants, it is necessary to design and execute a special program for those 
more vulnerable in order to adapt to the needs of these two vulnerable groups.36 
The third category of measures embraces “alternative approaches to addressing 
disarmament and unregulated weapons, [and the] delicate equilibrium between justice 
and peace, which every country must balance.”37 This approach is required when 
disarmament stage is very complex, and it becomes almost impossible to collect all the 
weapons from the former combatants. 
Finally, these four guiding principles—national ownership and responsibility; 
DDR as a process; DDR as a part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery 
strategy; and the ability to incorporate lessons from past experiences—and their complex 
34 United Nations, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): 
Practices in Peace Operations (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
January 18, 2010), 4, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Naval Postgraduate School, “Short Course on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 
Monterey, California: Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, International Organization for 
Migration, Save the Children (U.S.), and Initiative for Inclusive Security (2008), 7, http://www.csrs-
nps.org/public/docs/ddr_2008.pdf. 
37 United Nations, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): 
Practices in Peace Operations, 5. 
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and comprehensive application through the “Second Generation” DDR, make up the 
basis for a lasting peace in those countries transitioning from war to peace. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will examine DDR “best practices” and lessons learned through a 
comparative study in El Salvador, South Africa, and Colombia cases. This analysis will 
focus on the four DDR guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor—national ownership 
and responsibility; DDR as a process; DDR as a part of a broader security, stabilization 
and recovery strategy; and incorporating lessons from past experiences—to demonstrate 
the degree of success or failure in implementing DDR in each case. In addition this thesis 
will analyze the research’s findings on “Warning Signals and Preemptive Actions”38 to 
ensure DDR in accordance with the ideal scenario laid out by Colletta, Kostner and 
Wiederhofer, because, “there is much to be learned from the things that have gone wrong, 
to varying degrees in all of the programs to date.”39 
According to the fourth guiding principle of Ball and van de Goor, DDR in El 
Salvador was chosen as a case study mainly because of the predominant rural character in 
the FMLN, which has similarities to the origin of the FARC. Likewise, the two insurgent 
groups claim to share a common bond in land rights and the exclusion of the peasant 
classes by the dominant political power both in El Salvador and Colombia. A third 
important condition is that DDR in El Salvador is considered a successful example of 
such processes.40 
DDR in South Africa provides important lessons of reconciliation between parties 
involved in protracted conflicts. The complexity of the South African case, due to the 
presence of multiple actors and multiple human rights violations committed by state and 
38 Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 33. 
39 Ibid., 32. 
40 Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” International Center for 
Transitional Justice, 6–7, https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-ElSalvador-CaseStudy-2009-
English.pdf. 
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non-state actors, constitutes an important reference for designing a DDR program in 
Colombia, a country which successfully faced many of the same issues.41 
Because Colombia also has experience in DDR processes, it is important to 
recognize the lessons in these processes to help implement a new and improved DDR 
scheme. It is mandatory to undertake the challenge of reintegrating the FARC into 
Colombian society, so that Colombia’s long conflict will cease to perturb regional peace 
and stability. 
This thesis will rely upon secondary sources such as books, country studies of 
South Africa, El Salvador, and Colombia, government reports of those countries, and 
scholarly articles that contribute to the overall outcome of DDR in each case. Another 
important source is UN documents that explain the objectives, definitions, and 
characteristics of DDR. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be divided into five chapters. Chapter I will look at the scholarly 
literature on DDR, its evolution, and guiding principles. Chapter II will give a general 
overview of DDR’s successes and failures since the end of the Cold War in El Salvador 
and South Africa. Chapter III will look at Colombia’s experience in DDR from the end of 
la Violencia in 1958 to the demobilization of the insurgent group M19 in the late 1980s. 
Chapter IV will examine Colombia’s most recent DDR experience with the AUC from 
2003–2006, as well as the “individual demobilization” programs for insurgents that have 
been in place in Colombia since 2002. Based on all those experiences, as well as those of 
other countries, Chapter V will consider the potential issues that a demobilization of the 
FARC may entail, given its decentralized structure, largely peasant or at least uneducated 
and ill-equipped membership to transition to what has become a booming Colombian 
economy. 
41 African Union Panel of the Wise, Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and 
Challenges in the Fight against Impunity, The African Union Series (New York: International Peace 
Institute, February 2013), 9, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
ipi_e_pub_peacejusticeafrica.pdf. 
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II. DDR IN EL SALVADOR AND SOUTH AFRICA
The Truth Commission ignored completely that which was the goal of the 
peace process: to incorporate into the political life armed people. 
–Alfredo Cristiani
A. DDR IN EL SALVADOR 
1. Introduction
On March 6, 2014, the citizens of El Salvador went to the polls in the second 
round to choose the president for the period 2014–2019. For the Frente Farabundo Marti 
para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), the victory of Salvador Sánchez Cerén represents 
the consolidation of its political project, since the outgoing president, Mr. Funes, also 
belongs to the same party. The previous fact constituted a clear evidence of democracy 
and the peace consolidation in El Salvador, from which 20 years ago the FMLN was 
formed as the largest armed opposition to the Government of El Salvador (GOES). 
According to many scholars, El Salvador’s process is considered among the “most 
successful cases of implementing peace agreements in the post-Cold War period.”42 
What were those successes and how did they come about? This section of the chapter will 
offer an overview of the main actors in the Salvadoran conflict and human rights issues. 
The second part will analyze DDR in El Salvador through Ball and van de Goor’s four 
guiding principles: national leadership and responsibility; DDR should be approached as 
a process; DDR is part of a broader security, stabilization, and recovery strategy, and 
DDR stakeholders must learn from past experiences.43 Finally, with the conclusions, it 
will attempt to draw parallels to the Colombian case.  
42 Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” 6. 
43 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
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2. DDR in El Salvador: Actors and Human Rights Issues 
Scholars believe that the origins of the conflict in El Salvador lie with the 
exclusion of the majority of the population from political power. A second cause was the 
profound inequality in land distribution, which impoverished the peasant population. 
These two aspects were reinforced through a heavy militarization of El Salvador, and the 
subsequent military repression of discontent.44 The El Salvadoran military had exercised 
total power in El Salvador from 1932 until 1979, through the succession of military 
dictatorships.  
From 1980 to 1992, El Salvador was devastated by a civil war that caused the 
deaths of more than 74,000 persons, and forced the displacement of more than one 
million of its inhabitants.45 In the wake of the dramatic levels of violence, social unrest, 
and the absence of a clear military victory for either of the warring parties, peace talks 
were initiated in 1990. However, the road to peace was not an easy one—indeed, earlier 
attempts to broker a peace in 1984 during the presidency of José Napoleon Duarte had 
failed.46 
a. Actors 
The main actors in the El Salvador DDR process included the GOES, the FMLN, 
and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).  
(1) GOES 
In 1989, Alfredo Cristiani, candidate of the right-wing party ARENA, was elected 
president of El Salvador. Although analysts of the conflict were convinced that, due to 
Cristiani’s political convictions, the president would intensify the struggle against the 
FMLN; the Salvadoran ruler on the contrary offered to negotiate.47 
44 Alpaslan Özerdem, Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (London, 
England: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009), 55–58. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 59. 
47 Simon A. Molina, The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984 - 1992) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 
Army War College, 1996), 6, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA309381. 
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One of the reasons was certainly the financial and economic costs of the war—at 
the outset of Cristiani’s term, more than 50 percent of the budget of GOES was dedicated 
to support the war against the FMLN. Likewise, the military was viewed as a tool of the 
wealthy class of the country, which included Cristiani, and hence lacked legitimacy in the 
eyes of many. El Salvador became the sixth largest recipient of U.S. military aid, 
because, in the context of the Cold War, Washington viewed with concern the emergence 
of rebel movements that threatened the countries of Central America. “The United States 
provided the Salvadoran government with $3.2 billion in economic aid and $1.1 billion in 
military aid between 1980 and 1991, which was indispensable in preventing a victory by 
the Cuban- and Nicaraguan-backed rebels.”48 
(2) FMLN 
The FMLN arose in 1980 as a result of the union of five rebellious groups that 
were seeking to overthrow the GOES. The name was adopted in honor to the founder of 
the Salvadoran communist party. The FMLN received support in the form of weapons, 
cash, and training from the former Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.49 
According to Alpaslan Özerdem, there were three principal factors to explain the 
formation of the FMLN. The first factor corresponds to the increasing number of human 
rights abuses carried out by officially tolerated death squads between 1979 and 1981. The 
second factor was the assassination of Oscar Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador and 
fierce advocate of human rights. The third was the peasant’s desire for revenge and 
protection against landlords and military forces.50 The FMLN eventually numbered 
15,000 members, including non-combatant wounded personal and political cadres.51 
With this force, the FMLN launched two ‘final offensives,’ one in 1981, the other in 
1989, in El Salvador, and especially against San Salvador. While these offensives failed 
48 Charles T. Call, “Democratization, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El 
Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (November 2003): 827‒862, 831, 
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/CallJLASl.pdf. 
49 Molina, “The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984–1992),” 7‒10. 
50 Özerdem, Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 59. 
51 Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” 8. 
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to bring the FMLN to power, they testified to the strength and persistence of the rebels, 
which persuaded Cristiani to negotiate. 
(3) ONUSAL 
To ensure the success of the peace process in Central America (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), in 1990 the UN Security Council 
established the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA).52 
ONUCA became the first peace-keeping mission of the UN, and its mandate was 
promulgated to assist in the DDR process to the countries of that region. 
United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created in May 
1991 with the explicit mandate “to verify implementation of all agreements between the 
Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion 
Nacional.”53 ONUSAL operated in El Salvador from July 1991 to April 1995. Its 
mandate encompassed agreements verification, the exploration of land tenure issues, and 
the DDR process that included a reduction of the Salvadoran armed forces.  
b. Human Rights  
Inequality of land distribution in El Salvador was significant, where only 0.5 
percent of the producers possessed 100 hectares or more for the development of 
agricultural production. By contrast, 71.3 percent of the producers possessed less than 10 
percent of productive land, with properties averaging of less than 2 hectares.54 
The struggle for control of the land and political power led El Salvador into a 
spiral of violence in the 1980s, which in turn led to systematic violations of human rights 
by both parties in the war. The FMLN was responsible for massive displacement of 
Salvadorans due its policy of forced recruitment, and by the indiscriminate use of IEDs in 
the countryside. The GOES was charged with indiscriminate air bombardment of the 
52 United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” 16. 
53 United Nations, “United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/onusal.htm.  
54 Daniel Flores, “El Salvador: Problematica Relacionada con las Tierras Excedantarias en el Marco 
del Acuerdo de Paz,” [El Salvador: Problems Related to Land Excedantarias in the Framework of the Peace 
Agreement], (San Salvador: 1998), 2, http://www.repo.funde.org/620/1/AVANCES-13.pdf. 
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peasant population, the killing of captured guerrilla members, and for the formation of 
death squads, which led a systematic campaign against human rights’ defenders.55 
3. DDR in El Salvador: Four Guiding Principles
Ball and van de Goor established four guiding principles for “a framework within 
which DDR programming can occur.”56 In the case of El Salvador, through the 
application of those principles it is possible to establish the scope and the shortcomings of 
the DDR process. 
a. National Leadership and Responsibility
Without national leadership and responsibility, there is scant probability for 
success in DDR processes. The leadership of Alfredo Cristiani, El Salvador’s president 
from 1989 to 1994, has already been mentioned. As an initial step, in September 1989, 
Cristiani restarted the dialogue with the FMLN, which had been initiated and then 
abandoned by his predecessor Duarte in 1984. However, this process was interrupted 
only two months later by the FMLN’s second “final offensive” in November 1989. The 
FMLN’s failure confirmed the stalemate.  
Due the lack of confidence between the parties into the conflict, mainly caused by 
the extensive human rights violations, ONUSAL became a necessary facilitator of the 
peace process. Armed with a broad mandate, ONUSAL accomplished many crucial tasks 
“including a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, 
creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, 
land tenure, and other economic and social issues.”57  
Although the responsibility of the DDR was shared among the three main actors, 
the demobilization process concluded successfully. The parties were committed to ending 
the civil war that had bled El Salvador for 12 years. Unfortunately, shared responsibility 
meant that the process of reintegration went less smoothly.  
55 Molina, “The Peace Process in El Salvador (19841–992),” 16. 
56 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
57 United Nations, “United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.” 
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b. DDR as a Process 
DDR in El Salvador followed a complex timetable. However, “the Salvadoran 
experience shows that is not a direct or linear relationship among the different 
components of DDR.”58 In that process, the stages were developed simultaneously.  
The implementation of the agreements gave two very significant results for the 
society of El Salvador. First, it gave rise to a profound restructuring of the political 
system: many institutions were reformed, and the FMLN converted from a military 
organization into a political party. Second, the country’s security agencies were entirely 
revamped: the army shrunk by 50 percent and changed its doctrine; former members of 
the FMLN were incorporated into a new national police; and the entire system of national 
intelligence was reorganized. In numerical terms, this meant that approximately 30,000 
members of the armed forces were demobilized, as were 8,000 FLMN combatants and 
6,450 injured non-combatants and political cadres.59 Despite its success, DDR in El 
Salvador was hardly flawless. Many of the reintegration programs never materialized and 
the special needs of women and children combatants were not taken into account in the 
process.  
c. Security and Stabilization 
The third principle corresponds to the statement that “DDR should be viewed as 
part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone 
intervention.”60 The lack of support to the reintegration of former FMLN combatants, 
and even former soldiers possibly contributed to the rise of criminal gangs. According to 
Thomas Bruneau in his book Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, 
“Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street Gang gained ascendancy in the early postwar 
period.”61 Bruneau also emphasizes the participation that included old gangs in El 
58 Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” 19. 
59 Özerdem, Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 61 
60 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
61 Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert and Elizabeth Skinner, Maras: Gang Violence and Security in 
Central America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), 48. 
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Salvador DDR process, since some of these organizations were used by the FMLN during 
its offensive. Because of this, those group members were included by the GOES as part 
of fighters to be reinserted into society after the cessation of hostilities.62 Although the 
author makes it clear that the failures in demobilization of combatants of the Salvadoran 
Civil War is not the main cause of the gangs in El Salvador, the cessation of the war and 
the mass deportation of young gang members, mainly from California, led to the growth 
of the criminal structures in El Salvador.63 
Failure to collect the weapons of the combatants added another variable to the 
continuation of violence inside the country. Criminal gangs, can easily find guns in 
hidden stockpiles remaining from El Salvador’s war. Those factors have combined to 
make El Salvador one of the most dangerous countries in the world, with a homicide rate 
of 69 per 100,000, the second highest in the world in 2012.64 
d. Learn from Past Experiences 
According to this principle, “all DDR stakeholders—national, regional and 
international—should make a serious effort to learn from past experiences.”65 The DDR 
processes differ from one country to other, and must adjust to the political circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that successful DDR missions possess common characteristics 
that must be integrated into the planning and initiation of new DDR processes. Because 
El Salvador was one of the first DDR cases after the Cold War, there was little previous 
experience to rely on.  
4. Conclusions 
GOES engaged in the DDR process of its own military forces, because of the 
human rights violations of its members, and because of the military stalemate with the 
62 Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner, Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, 48. 
63 Ibid., 49. 
64 Department of State of the United States, “El Salvador 2013: Crime and Safety Report,” Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13875. 
65 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
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FMLN. On the other hand, the FMLN lost its political and financial support after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, and because of the change in Nicaraguan ruling party, the main 
sponsor of the insurgents in El Salvador. While the actors accepted DDR as an 
experiment, its application proved the best path to ending political violence in El 
Salvador. However, unresolved social conflicts, and the failure of reintegration of 
combatants into Salvadoran society transitioned the political violence of the civil war to 
another bloodier organized crime violence.  
Likewise, human rights issues loomed large during the El Salvador conflict. In El 
Salvador, amnesty was one way to cut the Gordian knot of stalemate. However, more 
than 20 years after the end of the civil war, many Salvadorans are wondering if it is 
necessary to abolish the general amnesty law, to bring true and justice, in a way that the 
Salvadorans could reach reconciliation after have experienced a war.  
Through the four guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor, the analysis of the 
DDR process in El Salvador highlights important aspects to take into account, beginning 
with President Cristiani’s leadership in opting for negotiation over continued conflict. 
Although the responsibility and burden of peace negotiations, verification, and DDR was 
shared among three entities—the GOES, the FMLN and ONUSAL—this “burden 
sharing” failed to produce better outcomes for the reintegration phase. Although the 
actors in the DDR process accompanied the reintegration of former combatants, GOES 
have exercised its leadership more strongly, and taken charge of this stage. This would 
have avoided the dilution of reintegration, and enabled a better quality of life for former 
combatants. Second, despite its complexity and the limited timeframe for 
implementation, the DDR process in El Salvador had sufficient flexibility to be 
successful. Third, the security situation in El Salvador during and after the DDR process 
became worse than during the war. It is necessary to implement measures to avoid 
instability caused by former combatants who organize into criminal gangs. Fourth, during 
the DDR process in El Salvador, the three main actors created a new model to manage 
the reconstruction of a country after a protracted conflict. 
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a. Similarities with Colombia
Presently, in the Colombian case, the two main actors are the protagonists of the 
peace process, GOC and FARC. In both conflicts in Colombia and El Salvador, the 
origins of the armed groups have a common origin in the tensions of the Cold War. Both 
armed groups, FMLN and FARC, share the peasant characteristics of their combatants. 
Likewise, the two insurgent groups also share a common claim of land rights, and call for 
inclusion of peasants in the political process both in El Salvador and Colombia. 
According to the most recent national survey, the National Administrative Statistics 
Department (DANE) found that 42.8 percent of Colombian peasants live in poverty, and 
19.1 percent live in extreme poverty.66 This situation benefits FARC’s recruitment efforts 
and popular support. 
Additionally, as was proved in the DDR of the Colombian paramilitaries in 2003, 
to ensure transparency of the process and generate confidence among the parties, a 
mediator is required. In 2003, the Organization of American States (OAS) oversaw the 
process of disarmament and demobilization of the former Colombian paramilitary 
fighters. For this reason, it should be expected that in the event of a DDR process of the 
FARC, an international organization with credibility in both parties, would help 
guarantee the integrity of the process.  
Unfortunately, many former fighters of the AUC preferred to turn to crime 
following the demobilizations of 2003–2006, rather than seek legal employment. This has 
resulted in a new post-conflict phenomenon in Colombia known as the BACRIM, 
organizations that participate in drug trafficking and extortion in areas of formerly under 
AUC influence. Because of this, one of the most salient concerns in Colombia is that 
criminal structures may emerge from a future demobilization of FARC fighters. 
66 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas de Colombia (DANE), “Pobreza Monetaria 
y Multidimensional 2013,” [Monetary and Multidimensional Poverty 2013], (Bogotá, Colombia: DANE, 
2014), 22, http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/condiciones_vida/pobreza/pres_pobreza_2013.pdf. 
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B. DDR IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Sport has the power to change the world, the power to inspire, the power 
to unite people in a way that little else can. Sport can create hope ... It is an 




On June 24, 1995, during the Rugby World Championship Final, Nelson 
Mandela, then South African president, seized the opportunity to send a political message 
of nation building both to the international community and to his fellow citizens in South 
Africa. On that day, wearing the team colors, Mandela was acclaimed by 65,000 white 
rugby fans of his own country.67 This was a remarkable turn-of-events given that the 
National Peace Accord (NPA) between the parties involved South Africa’s protracted 
conflict had been signed barely two years previously. 
Mandela’s embrace of rugby, a primarily Afrikaans sport, was meant to 
strengthen the message of unity among South Africa’s multi-racial community in Simon 
Kuper’s words, “Playing fields alone cannot build a Rainbow Nation. Nation building 
does not depend on rugby or cricket alone. A multi-racial society is built on political 
decisions, not just on winning the World Cup.”68  
Despite the symbolic importance of sport in creating a new national identity,69 
there are other aspects to be considered in order to explain the end of political violence in 
South Africa. One of the most important is the DDR process of former combatants, which 
was far from perfect in South Africa. Actually, according to psychologist Monica 
Bandeira, “in countries where aspects of the DDR process were poorly managed, such as 
67 Lynette Steenveld and Larry Strelitz, “The 1995 Rugby World Cup and the Politics of Nation-
Building in South Africa,” Media, Culture & Society 20, no. 4 (October 1998), 609–629, 621–622, 
http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/20/4/609.full.pdf+html. 
68 Simon Kuper, “Playing Fields Alone Cannot Build a Rainbow Nation Nation-Building does Not 
Depend on Rugby or Cricket Alone. A Multi-Racial Society is Built on Political Decisions, Not just on 
Winning the World Cup SIMON KUPER - ON THE GAME,” Financial Times, July 13, 2002, 20, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/249305776?accountid=12702. 
69 Steenveld and Strelitz, “The 1995 Rugby World Cup and the Politics of Nation-Building in South 
Africa,” 609–610. 
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South Africa, the effects are long lasting and still being felt today.”70 Taking into account 
precisely these shortcomings, and considering the current peace process between the 
Government of Colombia and FARC, the shortcomings of DDR in South Africa may 
serve as an important example for the Colombian Government when implementing its 
own process with FARC. 
The purpose of this section is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of South 
Africa’s DDR process as a potential guide for the Colombian situation going forward, 
should the FARC agree to demobilize. The first part of this section will provide an 
overview of two principal characteristics of DDR in South Africa—the fate of the 
combatants, and the respect for human rights as integral to the process. It will then 
analyze DDR in South Africa through Ball and van de Goor’s framework.71 Finally, this 
section will evaluate the relevance of South Africa’s experience for Colombia, assuming 
a successful conclusion of negotiations between the GOC and the FARC. 
2. South Africa’s Conflict: Actors and Human Rights Issues
The racial tensions between two civilizations, European and native, in South 
Africa, dated back to the first meeting of those same human groups on the soil of that 
nation and resulted in violent conflict. The arrival of Jan van Rieebeck from Holland to 
the Cape in 1652,72 began a long and tragic history of subjugation and apartheid that was 
only surpassed by the end of the 20th century. 
Thus, it is precisely the end of the 20th century which is the focus of this analysis, 
for obvious reasons of time and space. In addition, during the decades of the 1970s and 
1980s, the political struggle of the black population in South Africa went from being a 
70 Monica Bandeira, “Ex-Combatants in South Africa: How to Address their Needs,” Intervention: 
International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work & Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict 7, 
no. 1 (2009), 61–66, http://www.ourmediaourselves.com/archives/71pdf/71%20Bandeira.pdf. 
71 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
72 Murray Faure and Jan-Erik Lane, eds, South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions (London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd., 1996), 12. 
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popular resistance movement to an armed struggle, due to the violent repression by the 
Government of South Africa.73 
The 1983 tricameral Constitution of South Africa, signed by whites, Indians, and 
coloreds, was the trigger for a popular revolt across the country. The reason is obvious; 
the black population, which represented the 74.8 of the total population of South Africa, 
was excluded from the new constitution, whose purpose was precisely to provide a 
political opening in the country.74 
Political violence in South Africa was not limited to the struggle between the 
black population and the South African Defense Forces. On the contrary, at the end of the 
1980s, a larger number of murders came from the violence among black factions.75 
“Between 1985 and 1989, a total of 5,387 persons died as a result of political violence.”76 
Political violence, internal pressures, and isolation from the international 
community, led to the February 2, 1990, speech by President F. W. de Klerk during the 
installation of the sessions of the congress. Within the discourse, “de Klerk announced 
the unbanning of political organizations, the release of political leaders from prison, and 
free political activity for all.”77 Following this, South Africa began the process of 
reconciliation that would end the apartheid regime. 
a. Actors  
The major players in South African DDR process were the South African 
Government (SAG) and the African National Congress (ANC); however, other important 
actors in the political and military arena included the Inkhata Freedom Party, Azanian 
73 Peter Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord, United States 
Institute of Peace (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 3. 
74 Ibid., 8‒9. 
75 Ibid., 10‒11. 
76 Ibid., 9. 
77 Ibid., 4. 
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National Liberation Army (AZANLA); Azanian Peoples Organization, the Pan African 
Congress, and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB).78 
(1) SAG 
During the mandate of P. W. Botha (1984–1989), the National Party (NP), the 
party of government in South Africa, introduced the National Security State (NSE) in the 
country. Botha, supported in the South African Defense Forces (SADF), exercised an 
iron-fisted control of the majority black, Indian, and colored. NP implemented the NSE 
“as a response to the threat posed by revolutionary warfare against those Third World 
governments aligned with the West.”79 However, Botha’s NSE was a complete failure. 
For that reason, in 1989, the SA president began a series of timid reforms to try to reduce 
racial and political tensions within South Africa, which had degenerated into political 
violence.80  
President F.W. de Klerk assumed the presidency in 1989 in the midst of a political 
crisis, which ended with the withdrawal of his predecessor P.W. Botha.81 Two months 
after assuming the presidency of SA, President F.W. de Klerk closed the NSE and ended 
the SA nuclear program.82 Those presidential decisions added to Nelson Mandela’s 
liberation and the unbanned of ANC, gave unmistakable signals to the entire country of a 
real willingness of SAG to begin a peace process with the ANC.  
(2) ANC 
The ANC was formed in 1912, with “its aim to bring all Africans together as one 
people to defend their rights and freedoms.”83 There are four factors in the history of 
78 Philip Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa’s Democratic Transition 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 2. 
79 Chris Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Macmillan, 1996), 272. 
80 According to Alden, P.W. Botha started “tentative contacts” with ANC secretly in early 1984 in 
Geneva. However, the informal negotiations with Mandela became public in 1988. 
81 Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State, 265‒272. 
82 Ibid., 279. 
83 African National Congress web page, “A Brief History of the African National Congress,” 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206. 
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ANC, before they attained power democratically. The first is the “Defiance Campaign” 
that started the organization in 1952 against SAG. The campaign consisted of “massive 
demonstrations, the burning of the hated passes critical to the maintenance of influx 
control, boycotts, and other acts of civil disobedience.”84 Second, in March 1960, SAG 
killed 69 black protesters in the town of Sharpeville. SAG, in addition to the 
indiscriminate use of force, also imposed a state of emergency within the country. 
Political opposition in SA was banned, and the ANC was no longer legal.85 The response 
of the ANC was to initiate an armed campaign, through its armed wing, Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, MK).86 The aim was clear; there was no other way to 
achieve the goal rather than to overthrow the SAG. 
The third factor was Nelson Mandela’s capture in 1962, just after the initiation of 
the ANC armed campaign.87 Mandela’s term in prison was a source of leverage for the 
ANC in its political struggle against SAG. “Mandela became the symbol of the struggle 
against apartheid”88 at the global level, and he knew how to exploit this fact. From 1986 
onward, Nelson Mandela had begun to prepare the foundation for possible negotiations 
with SAG.89  
The fourth factor was the stalemate in the armed struggle between the SAG and 
ANC. Despite SAG’s leverage of power, it did not have “public support or legitimacy, 
and was isolated internationally.”90 On the other hand, ANC did not have resources, “but 
it enjoyed broad legitimacy, public support, and wide international recognition and 




88 Mail & Guardian, “Nelson Mandela Dies,” December 5, 2013, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-05-
nelson-mandela-dies. 
89 Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord, 4. 
90 Ibid. 
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support.”91 By October 1986, the ANC admitted, “despite all our efforts, we have not 
come anywhere near the achievement of the objectives we set for ourselves.”92 
(3) Other Actors 
At the beginning of the negotiations, SAG and ANC “agreed to exclude the 
‘homeland’ and other non-statutory forces from participation in future discussions in 
order to avoid ‘complications.’”93 These parties, excluded from the initial dialogs, were 
Inkhata Freedom Party, AZANLA, Azanian Peoples Organization, and the Pan African 
Congress. The intention of SAG and ANC was to use the process to create a synergy, 
which would allow other parties to join the accords without having to consider their 
claims. This was a risky decision that might have sabotaged the negotiations and 
destabilized the country itself. However, this situation was corrected in time, and minor 
actors, such as the “homeland” armies and Inkhata, had a presence at the talks, which 
guaranteed that at least their concerns and aspirations would be heard.94 
The ideologically and racially opposing ends were “the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB, or Afrikaner resistance movement), the most militant of the 
right-wing groups, the Afrikaner Volksfront, and the followers of General Constand 
Viljoen.”95 All those groups “desire a white homeland or separate state rather than 
participation in a new multiracial state.”96  
With so many uneven actors within the DDR process, MK and SADF played an 
essential role “to secure a degree of internal order so political negotiations could 
continue.”97 The most important parts of the DDR process, SAG and ANC, “were deeply 
91 Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord, 4. 
92 Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State, 216. 
93 Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 2. 
94 Ibid., 6‒25. 
95 Diane L. Brook, Sherry L. Field, and Linda D. Labbo, “No Easy Road to Freedom: The New South 
Africa,” National Council for the Social Studies, Social Education Classrooms Focus (February 1995), 2, 
http://static.ncss.org/files/lessons/CFFeb95.pdf. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 3. 
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concerned that “unstable elements” could derail political negotiations.”98 DDR process in 
South Africa was a complicated case of negotiation due the multiplicity of actors, and the 
different ideologies and aspirations that these same actors had.  
b. Human Rights Violations 
A second important issue addressed in the peace talks was how to deal with 
human rights violations. Human rights violations in civil conflict have many sources—
racism, gender violence, vilification and dehumanization of the enemy, weak state 
institutions and the absence of the rule of law, and the escalation of violence that, as 
Clausewitz noted, is a characteristic of conflict. The threat of punishment for human 
rights violations may actually prolong a conflict, because warring parties often continue 
to seek leverage with peace talks. Even with the successful conclusion of peace, some 
factions may choose to fight on, convert to predatory activities, or the state may be too 
weak or lack legitimacy in some areas or with some groups to impose its authority. In 
these conditions, political violence with concomitant violations of human rights is likely 
to continue. 
In the South African case, the political rivalry between the ANC and Inkhata 
generated violence even as the peace process got underway, a violence fueled by 
accusations that the SADF was providing covert support to Inkhata armed elements.99 
Those events occured mostly in the “KwaZulu-Natal region and the most violent period 
was from 1990 to 1994.”100 According to Hugo van der Merwe and Guy Lamb, 33,713 
human rights violations, mostly committed against young black males, were documented 
by The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
The TRC found that some agents of the South African state perpetrated different 
types of gross violations of human rights, including “judicial and extrajudicial killings; 
and the covert training, arming and funding of offensive paramilitary units or hit squads 
98 Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 3. 
99 Hugo van der Merwe and Guy Lamb, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of South Africa,” 5, 
https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-South-Africa-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf. 
100 Ibid., 6. 
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for deployment internally against opponents of the government.”101 Likewise, Inkatha 
and the ANC were responsible for the killing of almost 6,000 people in the period from 
1980 to 1994. These groups also employed improvised explosive devices, which are 
explicitly proscribed by the rules of war.102  
In pursuit of reconciliation and stability in the country, South Africans chose to 
grant amnesty to all the actors in the conflict who had committed crimes, even human 
rights violations. These types of crimes were grouped under the rubric of ‘political 
violence.’ The amnesty applied both to members of SADF, as well as the so-called 
armies of liberation.103  
3. DDR in South Africa: Four Guiding Principles 
The principles described by Ball and van de Goor are a very useful tool for 
determining the most important aspects of the DDR process in South Africa. 
a. National Leadership and Responsibility 
Without strong national leadership and responsibility, the probability for success 
in the DDR process is low. As Mandela’s predecessor and poster boy for the apartheid 
system, it was President F.W. de Klerk who initiated regime change. Under pressure from 
international isolation and lack of legitimacy of his country’s regime, and after more than 
three decades of conflict, President F. W. de Klerk reached out to the opposition to 
propose peace talks.104  
In February 1990, President F. W. de Klerk “opened the way to a political 
reform,”105 and despite the opposition of radical sectors on both sides, he suspended the 
state of emergency in effect since 1984, which was designed to control and repress the 
black population. The state of emergency had allowed the militarization of towns affected 
101 van der Merwe and Lamb, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of South Africa,” 6. 
102 Ibid. This would also include the 1997 Convention prohibiting the use, stockpiling, transfer or 
production of anti-personnel mines. 
103 van der Merwe and Lamb, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of South Africa,” 7. 
104 Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord, 19–24. 
105 Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 2. 
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by violence that could not be controlled by police forces.106 The end of the state of 
emergency also ended the militarization of the country, and was a first step toward 
regaining civilian control of the SADF. 
The citizens of South Africa largely embraced the DDR process; however, 
success was not guaranteed. In the wake of the Boipatong massacre of June 1992, Nelson 
Mandela requested UN intervention following the breakdown of talks between the ANC 
and the government of South Africa.  
In 1992, under mandate of the General Assembly, the United Nations established 
the Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). UNOMSA has the mandate “to help 
quell violence in South Africa in coordination with the structures set up under the 
National Peace Accord signed on September 14, 1991.”107 However, the UN mandate 
was not limited to security issues; it also focused on “creating conditions for negotiations 
leading to the establishment of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa.”108  
South Africans never delegated leadership and responsibility for DDR, although 
President F. W. de Klerk took the first step in the DDR process by accepting the 
accompaniment of the UN while his successor, Nelson Mandela, assumed the 
implementation and execution of DDR, its most complex part, during his term as 
president of South Africa.  
b. DDR as a Process 
DDR is not a set of linear activities to be executed sequentially. On the contrary, 
it is a process, which although complex, must develop in a parallel and flexible way 
between its different stages. In the South African case, the DDR process contemplated 
the creation of a new state military structure which would include all military factions in 
the conflict.109 This complicated the process immeasurably, for not only was the size of 
106 Gavin Cawthra, Securing South Africa’s Democracy: Defense, Development, and Security in 
Transition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 3. 
107 United Nations, “Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council,” http://www.un.org/en/sc/
repertoire/subsidiary_organs/peacekeeping_missions.shtml#reg16.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 101. 
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the security forces to be reduced, but also room in the new organization would have to be 
found for the soldiers of all parties. The idea was that South African National Defense 
Force (SANDF) must be legitimate and inclusive, conditions that serve as the basis for 
the construction of a true peace among South Africans. 
The new SANDF also had to define a new chain of command, cope with budget 
restrictions, and create a unified force despite significant differences in the level of 
training and technical expertise among the combatants.110 The negotiations proved to be 
arduous, but had to be expedited to conclude before national elections. The agreements 
created the Defense Secretariat, which has the responsibility of “financial planning, 
research and development, procurement of weapon systems, and general administrative 
control over the daily activities of the armed forces.”111 The authority of the Defense 
Secretariat was also clearly established to design policies relating to the management of 
internal security, while external threats fall under the purview of the president. 
The next question was who would be incorporated in a new, if downsized, 
SANDF? All parties wanted their representatives present in the ranks; however, the 
differences in the level of training and technical expertise among the combatants made 
this an issue. Because they required greater technical expertise, the navy and the South 
African air force proved more reluctant to incorporate former insurgent combatants. This 
meant that most went to the army, which was executed under a complex training plan 
with advice and support of the British Military Advisory and Training Team 
(BMATT).112 
Due to numerical and budgetary constraints, approximately 6,000 combatants 
chose voluntary demobilization. The SANDF integrated 6,600 former members of MK 
and APLA, 10,000 from Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei Defense Forces 
110 Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 188. 
111 Ibid., 106. 
112 Ibid. 
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(TBVC), and 66,000 original members of SADF were retained in the new security 
force.113 
c. Security and Stabilization 
The third principle holds that “DDR should be viewed as part of a broader 
security, stabilization, and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention.”114 
As soon as the decision to reach a peace was taken, “the new challenge to all political 
leaders was to manage the coming transition to minimize violence during a period when 
the planned political and constitutional reforms were not yet in place.”115 
“As civil leaders appeared increasingly incapable of managing the violence 
outside the negotiation chambers,”116 the leaders of the SADF, the MK, and the Armed 
Forces of the ANC agreed to create the internal conditions to ensure the continuation of 
the political negotiations and to avoid incidents that could destabilize the country. The 
concern was to avoid “spoilers” from derailing the political process and compromising 
the upcoming presidential elections. This was a huge challenge, as the elections of 1994 
would be the first time that the majority black population could choose one of their own 
as the new ruler of South Africa, and the country could finally be recognized as a 
democracy. 
d. Learn from Past Experiences 
“All DDR stakeholders—national, regional, and international—should make a 
serious effort to learn from past experiences.”117 The DDR processes differ from one 
country to other, and must adjust to the political environment and in-country conditions. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that successful DDR missions possess common 
113 Cawthra, Securing South Africa’s Democracy: Defense, Development, and Security in Transition, 
149. 
114 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
115 Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord, 9. 
116 Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 3. 
117 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
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characteristics, which must be integrated into the planning and initiation of new DDR 
processes. 
Despite this principle, it is not very clear that the South Africans applied some 
lessons from other DDR processes such as El Salvador. However, UN observers who 
were deployed to South Africa had experienced DDR in El Salvador. For that reason, the 
presence of UN observers proved very useful in facilitating the settlement of disputes 
between the parties, and even to reducing the level of political violence in South Africa 
during the fulfillment of their mandate. 
4. Conclusions 
After the end of the Cold War, DDR became a prerequisite for peace in countries 
emerging from a prolonged conflict or civil war between its inhabitants.118 In the case of 
South Africa, the implementation of the DDR process was a condition for the 
construction of a new country. That process proved to be complex, in large measure due 
to the multiplicity of political actors in the conflict, who in turn possessed armies that 
they used to commit political violence. Likewise, the political violence continued even 
after the signing of the NPA. 
Through the four guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor, the analysis of the 
DDR process in South Africa highlighted important aspects to take into account. First, 
South Africans assumed the leadership and responsibility for DDR in order to ensure the 
process’ success. Second, despite its complexity and the little time for implementation, 
the DDR process in South Africa had sufficient flexibility, but the capacity required to 
carry out its execution. Third, the former combatants demonstrated, in a notable way, a 
commitment, vision, and restraint that allowed peace negotiations to proceed and brought 
stability to the country during the transitional period to democracy. The most important 
aspect was the joint effort of former enemies to design and implement the SANDF. 
Fourth, during DDR process in South Africa, the UN observers, the international 
stakeholder, possessed experience in processes of this nature and that contributed to the 
success of DDR in that country.  
118 Naval Postgraduate School, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 1. 
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a. Similarities with Colombia 
What are the lessons for Colombia in the South African case? The causes of the 
conflicts in the two countries overlap somewhat. In South Africa the tensions were racial 
and tribal in nature; however, these reflected economic inequality and political exclusion 
of a large group of citizens, characteristics shared by the Colombian case. Each country 
also has multiple actors to placate and human rights issues to resolve. The South African 
negotiations included multiple actors and were ultimately comprehensive. The GOC, 
however, has chosen to deal with its enemies piecemeal. At the time of writing, the 
ongoing negotiation in Havana involves only two actors, the GOC and FARC. The peace 
process and its future DDR implementation is leaving aside another armed group, the 
ELN. Despite its relative weakness, ELN maintains the capacity to perpetrate terrorist 
attacks in some peripheral areas inside Colombia. In the view of this author, the ELN 
remains an important actor and potential “spoiler” who should be invited to the 
negotiation table. Otherwise, a future DDR process could be seriously compromised. 
As in South Africa, the violations of human rights are echoed in Colombia, where 
it has become a significant issue. According to statistics from the Office of the Attorney 
General of Colombia, more than 4,000 members of the Colombian military forces have 
been accused of crimes related to violation of human rights, especially for extrajudicial 
killings and support of illegal paramilitary groups.119 Likewise, FARC is responsible for 
crimes such as the recruitment of minors, kidnapping, and planting landmines in vast 
areas of Colombia. For that reason, FARC and GOC are debating how to deal with the 
problem of war crimes and human rights violations committed by all sides in the 
Colombian conflict. If the decision is made to declare an amnesty for all parties, then 
some transitional justice mechanism like the TRC in South Africa will have to be 
considered. 
119 El Colombiano, “Fiscalía Investiga a Más De 4.200 Uniformados Por Falsos Positivos,” [Attorney 
General Investigates More than 4,200 Military by False Results Mounted During Operations (extrajudicial 




                                                 
III. COLOMBIA’S EXPERIENCE IN DDR FROM THE END OF 
LA VIOLENCIA IN 1958 TO THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE 
INSURGENT GROUP M19 IN THE LATE 1980s 
If I advance, follow me; if I step back, push me; if I betray you, kill me; 
if I die, avenge me. 
–Jorge Eliecer Gaitan 
 
A. THE COLOMBIAN DDR PROCESS DURING “LA VIOLENCIA” 
Even before the dawn of its modern republican life in 1886, the history of 
Colombia has been stained by public violence and civil war. But Colombia has also 
witnessed episodes of, if not reconciliation, at least compromise between warring 
political rivals that intermittently usher in a demobilization of combatants as prelude to a 
nonviolent intercessional. This chapter aims to explore the lessons of more recent 
demobilizations of combatants in Colombia, beginning with the end of more than a 
decade of civil war known as La Violencia in 1958.120   
Although La Violencia ended almost 60 years ago, the subsequent demobilization 
in the wake of a power-sharing compromise between Liberals and Conservatives contain 
valuable lessons on how Colombian political factions have worked together to curtail the 
violence. That lesson will serve to shed light on the 21st century peace process with 
FARC. Second, the FARC emerged from La Violencia as a faction that refused to 
acknowledge the 1958 compromise, which it condemned as an elite agreement that did 
nothing to aid the peasants who the insurgents claimed to represent.121 Likewise, to 
evaluate the successes and failures of the DDR process historically in Colombia, one can 
apply the principles described by Ball and van de Goor. 
120 La Violencia (1946‒1958), a civil war between partisans of the Liberal and Conservatives Parties 
constitutes without doubt the bloodiest period of violence in Colombian history. Scholars estimate the 
number of deaths at between 150,000 (Guzman, Fals & Umana) and 300,000 people (Palacios). 
121 Pedro Antonio Marin aka “Tirofijo,” the legendary FARC founder, in his speech during the 
installation of “El Caguan Process” in 1999 used the political exclusion of the Colombian peasantry as 
justification for the FARC’s continued resistance. Aka Timochenko, current FARC leader, uses the same 
justification to continue fighting against the Colombian government. 
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1. The Peace Attempt of General Rojas (1953–1957)  
Colombia’s periodic cycles of violence were tied to a patronage system linked 
directly to the presidency. In 1946, a conservative was elected president after 16 years of 
Liberal Party rule. As conservatives began to displace liberals in government on the 
provincial and municipal levels, a rumble of violence began in the country which was 
given a huge impulse in 1948 by the so-called “Bogotazo”—a civil insurrection that 
engulfed the Colombian capital following the assassination of popular Liberal politician 
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan .122 As the country became increasingly ungovernable, the head of 
the army, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, seized the power on June 13, 1953. According 
to some Colombian scholars, both liberals and conservatives acquiesced to Rojas Pinilla’s 
coup out of desperation.123 
Although identified principally with the conservatives, Rojas Pinilla adopted a 
populist posture that was meant to appeal across party lines. The dictator realized that 
rebel forces composed of small bands of armed insurgents could not be easily defeated in 
Colombia’s vast hinterlands. Instead, it was preferable to encourage their demobilization 
with a generous peace offer. On June 22, 1953, Rojas Pinilla issued the Decree 1546, 
which declared an amnesty for persons who had committed political crimes that also 
included murders. Rojas sent delegations to different parts of the country to persuade the 
armed groups to demobilize.124 
a. Process Stages  
At first, the results of this pacification campaign appeared promising, as about 
6,500 men in arms of different groups—liberal and conservative guerrillas and local self-
defense groups—agreed to demobilize.125 Unfortunately, this DDR process was not well 
122 “El Bogotazo” is the name gave to the violent riots in Bogota, capital of Colombia, due the 
assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a former presidential candidate and popular Liberal “caudillo.” That 
event ignited political violence all over the country. 
123 Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, trans. Richard Stoller (Durham and London: 
Duke University, 2007), 150. 
124 German Guzman Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umana Luna, La Violencia en 
Colombia, [The Violence in Colombia] 2nd ed., vol. I (Bogota, Colombia: Taurus, 2005), 118. 
125 Ibid. 
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organized, as their main effort was devoted to disarm and demobilize the combatants, the 
two first stages of DDR. The reintegration phase was not approached properly. Former 
guerrilla fighters and members of self-defense groups did not receive adequate support 
from GOC, and many fighters had forfeited their land and lost their livelihood. Disarming 
was also dangerous in the absence of a general political agreement—in small towns and 
villages where police forces were appointed by conservative mayors, and vigilante groups 
and blood feuds persisted, with retribution as a constant threat. For that reason, a great 
number of fighters were forced to return to the criminal groups out of a sense of survival, 
or drift to the cities where they tried to find anonymity and scratch out a livelihood.  
b. DDR Principles 
In the Ball and van de Goor framework, “national leadership and 
responsibility”126 were missing from Rojas Pinilla’s DDR effort. He involved neither the 
leaders of the political parties nor by the landowners; principal actors inside the tragedy 
through that Colombia was living, in his outreach. Instead, Rojas Pinilla directed the 
DDR campaign only through the military.127 Likewise, there was no unified control of 
the rebellious forces with whom he could deal. Rather, these were locally organized 
forces with their issues, leaders, and dynamics, who answered to no national command 
authority. All of this made it difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate a process that 
would include to all the combatants. 
Second, “DDR should be approached as a process, not a program.”128 Despite the 
creation of an Office of Rehabilitation and Help, tasked to deal with issues like land 
ownership, physical and social rehabilitation, and maternity-child protection,129 this 
government office lacked the authority, resources, and capacity to coordinate a 
comprehensive reintegration program for the demobilized. Third, “DDR should be 
126 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
127 Guzman Campos, Fals Borda, and Umana Luna, La Violencia En Colombia, 117. 
128 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
129 Guzman Campos, Fals Borda and Umana Luna, La Violencia En Colombia, 120. 
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viewed as part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy, rather than a 
stand-alone intervention.”130 Unfortunately, the process that was initiated in 1953 was 
limited only to the demobilization of combatants. The causes of the conflict were not 
adequately addressed, and violence continued to claim lives in Colombia for another five 
years and beyond. 
Fourth, “all DDR stakeholders—national, regional and international—should 
make a serious effort to learn from past experiences.”131 Despite the countless civil wars 
that Colombia had suffered since the nineteenth century, never before had the GOC 
attempted a DDR process on that scale. Additionally, there does not exist an official 
document that it suggests that GOC had studied foreign experiences to tackle the DDR. 
The president and the members of the Office of Rehabilitation were learning on the job, 
which contributed further to the inadequacies of the DDR process of 1953. 
Additionally, the Colombian Communist Party seized upon the political vacuum 
of leadership to assume the cause of the peasant “self-defense” movement. The 
communist “won the allegiance of peasant groups who chose not to accept the 
government’s offer” of peace.132 Because of this, the Colombians wasted an opportunity 
to reconcile their country. 
2. The Military Board 
A military junta forced Rojas Pinilla to step down in May 1957, as a prelude to a 
transition to civilian power. Despite its short time in power, the military junta 
acknowledged that the causes of “La Violencia” had not been addressed, and so created 
the Investigative National Commission of the Causes of the Violence (INCCV). 
However, the goal of this Commission was much more ambitious, and rather than simply 
carry out fieldwork on the causes of the violence in Colombia, the Commission 
approached insurgent groups to persuade them to reintegrate into civil society. This 
130 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 164. 
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outreach allowed the INCCV to arrange 52 local peace agreements throughout the 
country.133 This success caught the attention of the military junta which guaranteed its 
continuity with the transition to civilian governance. In fact, the military transitional 
government conducted consultations with President-elect Alberto Lleras Camargo, the 
first ruler of the National Front (NF)134 to give continuity to the functions of INCCV and 
thus ensure that the pacification effort did not lose momentum. 
3. First Peace Attempts of National Front 
The National Front was a compromise between liberals and conservatives that 
ensured that they would alternate as president for a decade. Furthermore, control of the 
police was taken away from the mayors and placed under the Ministry of Defense. The 
conclusion of a national political agreement gave new impetus to the demobilization 
process. Groups of rebels laid down their arms, and some even won seats in departmental 
legislative assemblies.135 Additionally, with the rotation of power that had been agreed 
upon between liberals and conservatives, the patronage system came to an end, and the 
police were depoliticized. From the second term of NF, violent deaths dropped 
dramatically in Colombia.136 From the initial estimate of 129 guerrilla and bandit groups 
(depending on your point of view) in 1949, by 1963 only 47 remained, of which 22 
continued to carry out violent acts.137 For Colombia, this was indeed significant progress. 
One of the characteristics of the GOC and its presidents is an absence of policy 
continuity. The government gave the INCCV 60 days to wrap up its work; however, due 
133 Guzman Campos, Fals Borda, and Umana Luna, La Violencia En Colombia, 130. 
134 The National Front (Frente Nacional) was an agreement between the leaders of the Liberal and 
Conservador party to overcome the political violence inside Colombia. The conversations took place in 
1957 in Spain where Laureano Gomez and Carlos Lleras, the leaders of both Colombian parties, agreed to 
alternate the presidency, and all the government’s positions in perfect symmetry and coordination. The first 
term was corresponding to the Liberals (1958‒1962), the following one the Conservatives (1962‒1966). 
Nevertheless, this political compromise did not solve the fundamental problems of Colombian society. On 
the contrary, it widened the divisions between the elites and the dispossessed. 
135 Marco Palacios, Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010, [Public Violence in Colombia: 
1958‒2010] (Bogota, Colombia: Ediciones Fondo de Cultura Economica Ltda, 2012), 90‒92. 
136 David Bushnell, Colombia: Una Nacion a Pesar de si Misma, [Colombia: A Nation in Spite of 
Itself] 14th ed. (Bogota, Colombia: Editorial Planeta Colombiana S.A., 2007), 321‒22. 
137 Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1973), 8. 
 39 
                                                 
to the overwhelming avalanche of testimonies of victims and perpetrators, as well as 
groups who demobilized, the INCCV’s task extended by a total of nine months.138 
a. Process Stages  
The INCCV was the principal actor in this new effort to pacify the country. The 
Commission had two fundamental objectives, the first of which was the signature of local 
peace agreements.139 As previously noted, in just nine months of operation the 
commission concluded more than 50 peace agreements, a remarkable achievement for 
DDR in Colombia in the 1950s. 
The second INCCV objective was to organize social and economic assistance to 
the affected regions.140 The members of the Commission were convinced that it was 
necessary to “socially engineer” the nation by changing the very structure of Colombian 
society to ensure conditions of stability and security that would allow the country to 
develop economically. However, these aspirations were beyond the mandate of the 
INCCV, which was limited “social diagnosis and humanitarian or palliative 
assistance.”141 With the recommendations emanating from the INCCV, and due to strong 
political pressure, the Lleras Camargo government created the Office of Rehabilitation. 
This agency’s main function was to create the infrastructure that INCCV had 
recommended in those areas hardest hit by the violence.142 The main effort was directed 
infrastructure development, not the reintegration of the combatants or justice and 
restitution for victims of violence. 
b. DDR Principles 
The four guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor were only partially met under 
the National Front. Although the INCCV was formed from members of two political 
138 Jefferson Jaramillo Marin, “La Comision Investigadora de 1958 y la Violencia en Colombia,” 
[The Investigative Commission of 1958 and the Violence in Colombia] Universitas Humanistica 72 (July–
December 2011): 43 http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/univhumanistica/article/view/2146. 
139 Ibid., 47. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., 50. 
142  Ibid., 51–52. 
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parties, the Catholic Church and the army, other sectors of society were excluded, 
including members of rebellious groups. Having been alienated, many of these turned 
toward the communists, who gained greater influence in the wake of La Violencia.  
Second, while several scholars agree that the INCVV’s success exceeded 
expectations, it did not approach DDR as a “process.” There was no follow-on support 
for its local peace agreements to reintegrate former combatants who were left with only a 
handshake and a signed agreement that they would not again take up their weapons. In 
addition, the needs of the victims of violence were not properly addressed. The process of 
demobilization, which began with good intentions, limited itself to reducing once again 
the number of men in arms. Only a few leaders of the communist guerrillas received 
lands from the GOC in compensation for rejoining to the society.143 These policies were 
both too little and inequitable, which deepened differences with the communist’s parties 
and laid the groundwork for more violence. 
Third, while this second post-1958 attempt to curtail violence was more thorough 
and better organized than that of Rojas Pinilla, it failed to recognize that the “DDR 
should be viewed as part of a broader security, stabilization, and recovery strategy, rather 
than as a stand-alone intervention.”144 In addition to INCVV, the GOC had created the 
Office of Rehabilitation and instituted a Committee of Public Order formed by the most 
important cabinet ministers to monitor the country’s security conditions. The INCVV had 
made a comprehensive diagnosis of country’s war-torn areas. Its work remained 
incomplete, and its time too short. To be successful, the DDR process must have a broad 
time horizon to undertake all the tasks necessary to achieve the permanent conditions of 
security and stability in the country. 
Fourth, while the National Front effort exceeded that of Rojas Pinilla, it failed to 
draw lessons it might have from the earlier failed peace process. Had it done so, 
Colombia might GOC have avoided another 50 years of fratricidal fighting? On the other 
hand, geopolitical conditions had changed as the Cold War settled in Latin America, 
143 Palacios, Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010, 92. 
144 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
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especially following Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution in Cuba. The confrontation between 
the GOC and guerrilla groups became much more ideological than had the murderous, 
but ideologically flaccid differences between Liberals and Conservatives, which drew 
their inspiration more from the 19th century than from the 20th. 
4. Conclusions 
Through several administrations beginning with 1953, the GOC tried 
unsuccessfully to end La Violencia. Although the government understood that peace is 
not simply about disarmament, the lack of commitment and resources did not permit the 
reintegration of ex-combatants into Colombian society. With this prominent fault in the 
DDR process, no country can achieve stability and security that would enable it to 
recover after a conflict. In Colombia, little effort was made to either reintegrate rebel 
combatants or to attack the profound economic and social tensions that had triggered the 
conflict. In both of the DDR processes analyzed from the 1950s, the GOC effort was 
concentrated on demobilization and disarmament, but devoted very little support, 
resources, and time to reintegration, a vital stage to build a lasting peace after years of 
conflict and hundreds of thousands of deaths.  
These two DDR processes failed to mobilize Colombian society to deal with the 
issues post-war justice and restitution for victims of violence, the concomitant of DDR. 
Rojas Pinilla approached DDR as a military operation. Members of the elite in Colombia, 
the military, political parties, and the Catholic Church led the NF process; however, it 
had an overwhelmingly political focus that ignored economic and justice issues that were 
taken up by the communists and other extreme revolutionary groups. 
Finally, the civilian government did not capitalize on the lessons from the failed 
DDR process of Rojas. While it is true that the political conditions had changed from one 
government to another with the growing influence of communists within the rebel forces, 
the causes of the conflict, the social and economic conditions of the combatants remained 
the same, or even worse. 
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B. THE DDR PROCESS OF THE M19 
Unlike the DDR processes of the 1950s, many scholars consider the DDR of the 
guerrilla group M19 that took place between 1986 and 1991 as a success.145 To 
understand why this was the case, one must first understand the political conditions in 
Colombia in the late 1980s. One must also understand that, in the Colombian context, 
M19 was an atypical guerrilla group. The insurgencies that persist in Colombia (FARC 
and ELN) have as their common roots, directly or indirectly, in La Violencia. In addition, 
the FARC and ELN operate mainly in Colombia’s rural regions where they claim to 
represent peasant interests.  
Although the M19 counted among its founding members former FARC adherents, 
“El EME” (“the M” as it was known in Colombia) came together—somewhat ironically 
given the former dictator’s devotion to DDR—as disgruntled supporters of Rojas Pinilla, 
following his failed bid in the presidential election of 1970. In their view, Rojas Pinilla 
had been cheated of certain victory by a corrupt political system.146 Some members of 
Rojas Pinilla’s Anapo party joined with other political sectors to take up arms to 
challenge the Colombian State. The M19, at its core a collective of university students, 
conceived of itself as an urban insurgency, as opposed to the peasant focus of the FARC 
and the ELN. There was almost a college prank dimension to their operational style 
which focused on “theatrical armed actions” aimed at protesting a corrupt political 
system rather than murdering large numbers of people.147  
1. The Dove Peace of Betancur (1982–1986) 
Belisario Betancur had been elected President of Colombia in 1982 on a promise 
of ending the strict security measures of his predecessor and bringing peace to the 
country. Consequently, Betancur had adopted the dove as his political symbol. On 
145 Rodrigo Pardo, in his book De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y 
Esperanzas [On First Hand, Colombia 1986–1994: Between Conflicts and Hope], considers that the DDR 
process of the M19 was successful, since the process was achieving the transformation of a rebel group in a 
group of broad-based political support in Colombia. Leon Valencia, a political analyst and demobilized in 
that process, considers that the DDR process of M19 was successful as well. 
146 Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: a History of Colombia, 1875‒2002, 189. 
147 Ibid., 196. 
 43 
                                                 
assuming office, he passed a law that granted “automatic, unconditional and 
comprehensive amnesty for all political prisoners and those who laydown their 
weapons.”148 As a result of Act 35 in 1982, the doors of Colombia’s jails swung open to 
release hundreds of prisoners, many of them belonging to the M19.149 As a further act of 
reconciliation, he created a series of commissions to coordinate all aspects of the 
negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. He also conceptualized the 
National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR) to address the underlying causes of conflict, as well 
as a myriad of boards and committees to monitor ceasefires and dialogue with the groups 
of insurgents.150 
During this period, Betancur sought to establish dialogues with the main guerrilla 
organizations of Colombia, which in this period included the FARC, the EPL, the ELN, 
and M19. He had some success, at least on paper, arranging ceasefires and political 
agreements. One of those was an agreement reached between GOC and FARC known as 
the “Agreement of La Uribe” (May 1984). Through that agreement, the guerrilla 
organization was allowed to organize a political party, which it called the Patriotic Union 
(UP). The UP achieved some modest success, sending representatives to the congress of 
Colombia, and to some town halls in small villages and medium-sized cities as municipal 
councilors. However, the ELN boycotted peace negotiations with the Colombian 
government, demonstrating the rifts in the insurgency.151 
In spite of the enormous efforts of Betancur, the president was unable to fulfill his 
campaign promise to bring peace to Colombia. For, if the guerrillas were divided, so 
were the Colombian people over Betancur’s olive branch to the insurgent groups. In any 
case, the President’s outreach to the Left was given its coup de grâce when M19, in 
148 Palacios, Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958‒2010, 142. 




                                                 
keeping with its “theatrical armed actions” strategy, undertook a bloody assault on 
Bogotá’s Palace of Justice in November 1985.152 
a. Process Stages  
Although Betancur achieved significant advances with the guerrilla organizations, 
the previously mentioned negotiations did not culminate in successful DDR processes. 
The GOC reached ceasefire agreements and even produced the concentration, prior 
demobilization, of members of the M19 in some camps to the south of Colombia.153 
Nevertheless, Betancur failed to achieve the disarmament or the reintegration of this 
group, as all parties violated the ceasefire agreements. The guerrillas took advantage of 
the truce to build up their strength, while the Colombian armed forces initiated operations 
in areas of guerrilla influence.154 Likewise, the president had taken the perilous step of 
authorizing the FARC to create a political group, the UP, without a DDR agreement. In 
this way, Betancur had played into FARC hands by validating its strategy of “combining 
all forms of struggle.”155 
A contrary interpretation is that the leadership of the FARC, notably Tirofijo, 
never wanted to participate in the political process, a strategy he saw as a threat to the 
integrity and cohesion of his essentially insurgent organization. This point of view would 
see Betancur as a master strategist who was derailed by right-wing elements in Colombia 
152  On November 6, 1985, an M-19 team took over the Colombian Palace of Justice. According to 
Palacios, in his book Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, “the assault was intended 
as armed theater, in early M-19 style: Betancur was to be tried for ‘betraying the peace process.’ But what 
began as propaganda, and potentially even comedy, ended in national tragedy.” During the two-day assault, 
nine Supreme Court Judges were assassinated as well as 60 M-19 members (Felbab-Brown, p. 91). 
153  Javier Giraldo, “Trece Años en Búsqueda de la Paz,” [Thirteen Years Searching for Peace]  
Desde los Margenes, http://www.javiergiraldo.org/spip.php?article16. 
154 Palacios, Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958‒2010, [Public Violence in Colombia: 1958–2010], 
144. 
155  According to Marco Palacios, the FARC were the guerrillas “more prepared to accept the truce, 
the ceasefire and its verification,” and participate in democratic elections. But, at the same time, the FARC 
took advantage of the truce to strengthen its military plan. FARC and M19, in the words of Palacios, were 
“fanning the fire, under the shield of peace.” 
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who attacked the UP with a campaign of exclusion and assassination.156 This was another 
strategy of disaggregation of the insurgency that was undone by the lack of a common 
strategy on the GOC side.  
b. DDR Principles 
Whatever one’s interpretation, President Betancur’s strategy proved to be overly 
complex. NPR was characterized by the multitude of commissions and State agencies 
that became an obstacle, because responsibilities were diluted and uncoordinated. No one 
was in charge of the process. Furthermore, Betancur created a civil-military relations 
problem when he offered insurgent groups “agreements of bilateral ceasefire that … 
treat(ed) equally the Army and the guerrillas.”157 
Second, Betancur raised expectations beyond realistic levels. The reality of 
Colombia in the 1980s was that there was no way that insurgent groups would accept the 
political status quo, or that demobilized fighters could be integrated into the legitimate 
economy.158 Third, while the “Agreement of La Uribe” was an innovative bet to 
marginalize the FARC, it showcased the disjunction of the existing peace efforts of GOC 
and the reality of violence that lived Colombia. La Uribe failed to account for “spoilers,” 
most notably the paramilitaries and drug traffickers who took the opportunity to attack 
the FARC via the UP. Over a period of five years, more than a thousand militants of the 
UP were killed, including two presidential candidates, as well as heads of the political 
156  In his book, De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos Y Esperanzas, Rafael 
Pardo, ex-Peace Commissioner and former Colombian Ministry of Defense, denies that the political 
murders of members of the UP were continuous. That political party, which was born in the Agreements of 
the Uribe, directly accused the Armed Forces of Colombia of the “dirty war” against its organization. The 
accusations were difficult to disprove, according to Pardo, due to the zero progress in the investigation of 
these murders. Even so, the same Attorney General accused 59 members of the Army of being allied with a 
paramilitary group, the Magdalena Medio, linked with political assassinations.  
157 Rafael Pardo Rueda, De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas, 
[On First Hand. Colombia 1986–1994: Between Conflicts and Hope] (Bogota, Colombia: Cerec, Norma, 
1996), 16. 
158 Joaquin Romero Herrera and Juan Carlos Gardeazabal Rodriguez, “Evolucion y Antecedentes 
Historicos de la Reintegracion En Colombia,” [Evolution and Historic Background of the Reintegration in 
Colombia] Estudios En Seguridad Y Defensa 5, no 2 (November 2010): 11‒12, http://www.esdegue.mil.co/
sites/default/files/10.pdf. 
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arm of the FARC.159 It may have been that Marulanda was secretly pleased, because the 
debilitation of the UP confirmed the strategy of armed struggle as the only viable way 
forward.  
Finally, one cannot accuse Betancur of being ignorant of the lessons of the past. 
Betancur had been part of the “Contadora Group,” an organization seeking to achieve 
peace agreements in Central America.160 Therefore, it was apparent that the President 
and his closest collaborators were well informed about the DDR experiences in Central 
America. Nevertheless, the GOC committed some of the same errors that had 
characterized previous frustrated attempts in Colombia, most notably the failure to give a 
seat in the peace commissions to all the sectors. In fact, Betancur erred in the other 
direction in that he excluded the military from the negotiations with the illegal groups.  
2. Barco’s Presidency (1986–1990) 
The absence of continuity in the approach to Colombia’s problems was apparent 
during the government of Virgilio Barco (1986–1990). First, in order to distance himself 
from the Betancur regime, the new president eradicated the word “peace” from 
documents and government statements in an attempt to lower popular expectations. In its 
place, he substituted concepts like reconciliation, normalization, and rehabilitation, to 
mark a break with the Betancur approach.161 Second, he sought to replace the numerous 
commissions which had characterized Betancur’s approach to peacemaking, with a single 
authority to coordinate negotiations.162 President Barco promulgated Law 77 of 1989 
“which empowered the President of the Republic to grant pardons to members of 
insurgent groups to allow them to participate in the peace process, express their 
159 Bushnell, Colombia: Una Nacion a Pesar de si Misma, 374. 
160 Pierre Gilhodes, “Contadora: Al Servicio Del Restablecimiento de la Paz,” [Contadora: At the 
Service of the Restoration of Peace], Nueva Sociedad, no. 72 (July-August 1984): 4, 
http://bdigital.binal.ac.pa/bdp/artpma/contadora.pdf. 
161 Pardo Rueda, De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas, 10‒15. 
162 Ibid. 
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willingness to lay down their arms and return to civilian life.”163 So far at least, it looks 
as if Barco was following the Betancur playbook. 
If most groups maintained an attitude of defiance, M19 appeared ripe for 
demobilization. First, President Barco took advantage of the weakening military and 
political prestige of the M19 in the aftermath of its failed assault on the palace of Justice 
in Bogota.164 Second, Barco strengthened the PNR program, most probably because he 
had worked in a similar program during the Lleras Camargo government in the decade of 
the 1960s,165 and the president was a first-hand witness of the program’s success.  
All these pre-conditions and contingent circumstances allowed the signing of an 
agreement between the GOC and the M19 in 1990, with the Catholic Church as a 
guarantor, abandoned by the Colombian middle class to which its principle militants 
belonged and discredited by the Palacio de Justicia fiasco, the M19 demobilized and 
formed a political party called the Democratic Alliance M19 (ADM19), which achieved 
some success at the polls.166 
a. Process Stages  
The GOC orchestrated the Disarmament and Demobilization stages of M19. The 
first step was to place them in camps previously agreed to with these guerrillas and under 
the supervision of technical commissions. 
163 Carlos Prieto and Joanna Rojas Roa, “Analisis Comparativo entre la Negociacion del M19 y 
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG),” [Comparative analysis between the Negotiation 
of the M19 and Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)], Boletines De Paz 25 (2010): 3, 
http://archive.ideaspaz.org/images/M-19yURNG.pdf. 
164  According to Rex A. Hudson in his article “Colombia’s Palace of Justice Revisited: A Critique of 
the Conspiracy Theory,” there are four facts that reveal the link between M19 and the Medellin cartel in the 
takeover of the Palace of Justice. First, the cartel had threatened to kill the judges who were going to take a 
decision on the extradition treaty between Colombia and the United States. Second, it was no coincidence 
that “the M-19 attack took place on the very morning when the Constitutional Chamber was beginning to 
deliberate on the treaty.” Third, M-19 included among their demands to the president that he was to issue a 
law against extradition. However, members of the guerrillas were not threatened by that Treaty; on the 
other hand, traffickers were. Four, there is evidence of the delivery of weapons by the cartel of Medellin to 
the M19, and the use of a boat by both groups. The boat named “Karina” was used both for the transport of 
drugs from the cartel, as well as to introduce weapons to Colombia for the M-19.  
165 Pardo Rueda, De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas, 20. 
166 Romero Herrera and Gardeazabal Rodriguez, “Evolucion y Antecedentes Historicos de la 
Reintegracion en Colombia,” 11‒13. 
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The success of the negotiations depended upon the concentration of 
guerrillas in protected camps, which allowed guerrilla leaders—in 
conjunction with politicians—to control their troops, and the GOC to 
control the M19 leadership.167 
The stage of reintegration was complete, in addition to the measures of financial 
support to sustain the fighters and their families. The M19 militants formed a political 
party, which became the third largest political party in Colombia,168 and won almost a 
third of the seats in the constituent National Assembly in 1990. 
b. DDR Principles 
Why was the DDR of M19 a success? Leadership played a part: President Barco 
led the process and, in contrast to Betancur, designated a single state agency effort to 
demobilize guerrilla groups. The High Adviser for Peace controlled the PNR, which 
meant that a single office coordinated efforts. Likewise, the president was behind the 
process.169 Second, the GOC was able to deploy the capabilities of the state through the 
agencies that President Barco had created and strengthened. The president also designed 
the legal tools in the congress and integrated the functions of the armed forces in pursuit 
of peace. 
Third, the GOC had a holistic approach to DDR through the PNR which Barco 
elevated to a true anti-subversive strategy. The GOC laid out the goals and strategy of the 
PNR, which had at its core improving the conditions of the poorest people in Colombia. 
In this way, the PNR also served as a social and political weapon to counter the 
arguments of the guerrilla organizations.170 Likewise, the High Commissioner for Peace 
took advantage of the margin of maneuver created by the PNR to pursue talks with 
guerrilla groups. Fourth, Barco, with his experience drawn from Betancur’s failed peace 
process, but also from lessons learned from the DDR failures of the NF governments, was 
167 Palacios, Violencia Publica en Colombia: 1958–2010, 147. 
168 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution, 2010), 92. 
169 Pardo Rueda, De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas, 21. 
170 Ibid. 
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able to capitalize on the failures and successes of these processes to achieve a great 
political triumph at the end of the process of DDR of the M19. 
3. Conclusions 
Although Betancur made enormous efforts and risked his political prestige, he 
could not induce any guerrilla group to demobilize. The causes of that failure reside first 
in a strong opposition from military and political sectors of the country to the peace 
process that many believed pandered to the communists. Second, the guerilla groups took 
advantage of the peace offers, ceasefires, and opportunities to talk, to rebuild. Third, the 
government ignored “spoilers” in the form of the paramilitaries and drug trafficking 
groups. The DDR of the M19 represented a real hope to reach the longed-for peace. The 
government of the President Barco set the conditions for a peaceful and successful DDR 
process. Nevertheless, the results were not optimized because the two most powerful 
guerrillas (FARC and ELN) were excluded from this process.  
Although the peace failed to materialize for Colombians, the M19’s DDR process 
testified to the fact that a guerrilla organization could demobilize and participate in the 
political process. For the first time since independence, Colombians could cast their votes 
for options other than the two traditional parties with their well-oiled patronage systems.  
Political violence continued that cost the lives of three presidential candidates, as 
well as a large number of members of the UP and ADM19. Another dimension that 
continues to cause considerable controversy in Colombia is the amnesty granted to the 
M19, especially as those officers who retook control of the Palace of Justice have been 
sentenced to long terms for alleged human rights abuses and excess of force in that 
military operation. 
Finally, the experience of the Betancur and Barco governments allows one to 
conclude that President Santos should direct the efforts of the state to achieve a process 
of DDR of the FARC, one which takes into account the following aspects: the reality of 
the violence affecting Colombia with criminal gangs, to prevent demobilized members of 
guerrilla organizations to transfer to criminal organizations. Second, the DDR process is 
based on effective coordination of all agencies of the state to ensure its success. Third, 
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the DDR process is sequential and results in the successful reintegration of former 
combatants into Colombian society. Finally, the DDR process will be guided by the four 
DDR principles described in this document. 
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IV. DDR PROCESSES IN COLOMBIA POST-9/11 
Because we will not lose heart until the last of the terrorists are 
defeated, those who wish to make peace with the Colombian State have 
merely to demobilize. 
–Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
 
The Government of Colombia has two immediate precedents to guide a possible 
FARC DDR process. The first is the collective DDR between 2003 and 2006 of over 
30,000 members of the AUC. The second example is the process of individual 
mobilization in place since 2002 aimed principally at the combatants of FARC and ELN 
in Colombia. The individual demobilization process became an essential part of the 
counterinsurgent struggle of the GOC. 
This chapter examines the implementation and the results of these two DDR 
processes to highlight those lessons that might be applicable in negotiations between the 
GOC and the FARC in Cuba. Like all DDRs, the collective demobilization of the AUC 
took place in particular circumstances. The second part of this chapter will analyze the 
process of DDR of the AUC, developed exclusively during the first administration of 
President Uribe. The third section will tackle the process of individual demobilization of 
combatants from insurgents groups between 2002 and 2012, a process that is still in 
effect today. This chapter will reiterate the stages of every process of DDR, both 
collective and individual, and compare them to the general principles of DDR as 
described by Ball and van de Goor.171 The final part of the chapter will attempt to assess 
the effectiveness of each DDR approach in Colombia. 
A. THE POLICY OF DEFENSE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY: THE 
URIBE LEGACY 
The situation encountered by Álvaro Uribe when he became president in 2002 
was far from reassuring. The government of Uribe’s predecessor, Andrés Pastrana (1998–
171 Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7. 
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2002), had engaged in more than three years of fruitless dialogue with the FARC. In the 
process, the COG had conceded a vast demilitarized area of the south of the country, 
known as the Caguán or despeje (“cleared zone” meaning cleared of government 
presence). Rather than accept the despeje as a gesture of good will and confidence 
building, the FARC had used it as a base to escalate the terrorist attacks and to draw out 
negotiations while they grew stronger politically and militarily. These circumstances tried 
the patience of the Pastrana government, who broke off negotiations in February 2002.172 
By 2002, the stability of the COG had become an issue of international concern. 
The level of violence exceeded the capacities of the state to deal with it, not only because 
of the threat of the leftist guerrillas, but also that of the AUC. The AUC, a confederation 
of criminal paramilitary groups who legitimized themselves in the name of patriotism and 
the inability of the COG to deal with the guerrilla threat, occupied large areas of the 
country, sometimes with the complicity of segments of the military, the intelligence 
services, and regional government leaders. Paramilitary groups had expanded in the wake 
of a vacuum of government authority since the presidency of Betancur (1982–1986). 
Segments of the military were complicit because they opposed periodic amnesties for the 
guerrillas, and as a reaction to the popular fear of being unprotected by the state.173 
A further powerful factor in paramilitary expansion was the atomization of the 
drug trafficking following the dismantling of the Cartels of Cali and Medellin, in large 
part as part of the U.S. “war on drugs” strategy.174 In other words, U.S. counterdrug 
policy had actually contributed to the destabilization of Colombia. These conditions 
created fertile ground for the establishment of private armies that threatened to transform 
Colombia into a failed state. These powerful paramilitary groups did not limit their 
criminal actions to drug trafficking—on the contrary, they diversify their sources of 
criminal financing through kidnapping, extortion, and forced displacement of people with 
172 In his book Violencia Publica en Colombia: 1958–2010, [Public Violence in Colombia: 1958–
2010], Marco Palacios highlights that Pastrana had understood that, after the attacks of 9/11, the dialogue 
with drug organizations, such as the United States considered the FARC, was unsustainable. 
173 Douglas Porch and Maria Jose Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: 
Transformation or Transition?” Studies in Conflicts & Terrorism 31, no. 6 (June 2008): 520‒540, 523, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10576100802064841#.VGsKQodN3FI. 
174 Ibid., 525. 
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the goal of seizing their land with the phrase that became notorious in Colombia: plomo o 
plata.175 
Faced with such a situation, newly elected President Uribe designed and 
implemented the most ambitious counterinsurgency strategy ever carried out in 
Colombia, which he labeled the policy of Defense and Democratic Security. Uribe’s 
Democratic Security was also accompanied by an effort to diminish the conflict with the 
implementation of DDR. Both the DDR process of the AUC and the current individual 
demobilization of guerrillas originated within the framework of the Uribe government. 
The irony was that the man—who many considered to be Colombia’s most warlike 
president—led his offensive with an effort to convince his enemies to disarm peacefully. 
Uribe was able to capitalize on the discontent of his countrymen, after the bitter 
experience of the failed process of Caguan. This discontent fuelled the first component of 
Democratic Security, the fight at the military level against the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries. At the same time, President Uribe was also supported by the U.S. 
Government, which in the wake of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, authorized 
the GOC to use the funds from the Plan Colombia in the fight against the “terrorists” of 
the FARC, ELN, and AUC.  
Uribe based the second aspect of his security policy on the call to the illegal 
armed groups to demobilize. To this end, the president gave a boost to the existing 
legislation by strengthening the state agencies responsible for advancing the process of 
demobilization. Uribe implemented these reforms in the wake of the failures of both the 
governments of Samper and Pastrana.176 The combined action of these two measures—
military pressure combined with the strengthening of the DDR process—allowed the 
GOC to reap unprecedented results. President Uribe’s initiative demobilized more than 
4,000 fighters in Colombia’s protracted conflict; however, not all of these results were as 
they seemed.  
175 Literally, “lead or silver,” meaning “bullets or money;” i.e., take the money or we kill you. 
176 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or 
Transition?” 525. 
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B. THE DDR PROCESS OF THE AUC  
From the perspective of the AUC, the advantages of DDR lay in its timing. The 
AUC had emerged out of the Convivir program launched in 1994 under President 
Samper, which mobilized privately armed groups to supplement an increasingly under 
performing Colombian military. An acronym for Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y 
Seguridad Privada, Convivir had been enthusiastically embraced by Uribe when he was 
Governor of Antioquia in 1995–1997. But these paramilitary groups had quickly turned 
into armed thugs who terrorized the populations in areas they controlled, often with 
military and government complicity, and became enmeshed in organized crime, most 
notably drug trafficking. Indeed, Uribe’s promotion of the Convivir, and other internal 
security programs like Autodefensas Campesinas, was used against him by his political 
enemies. AUC excesses that included drug trafficking as well as heinous crimes such as 
massacres of groups suspected of supporting the guerrillas and forced displacement of 
people whose land they coveted, had lost them popular support even among those once 
sympathetic to them. Therefore, the DDR of the paramilitary groups had at least three 
advantages for Uribe. First, it was an attempt to terminate a failed security experiment 
and regain control of the internal security dynamic for the state. Second, it would 
strengthen his hand with the guerrillas, who argued that they could never disarm while 
their paramilitary enemies, with active support of Bogotá, remained in existence. A third 
factor of great importance in the DDR process was pressure from the United States for 
the GOC and its armed forces to clean up their act by severing all connection with the 
paramilitary groups as a precondition for U.S. security assistance.177 Finally, from the 
perspective of the AUC leaders, this was their best chance to cut a favorable deal with the 
GOC that would give them relative immunity from prosecution for their horrendous 
crimes.178 
177 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or 
Transition?” 525. 
178 Ibid., 526. 
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1. Stages of the Process  
The DDR of AUC was fraught with controversy, beginning with the large 
numbers of people who sought to take advantage the process. While the COG estimated 
the numbers of paramilitaries at between 10,900 and 20,000 fighters,179 fully 31,698 
people stepped forward to demobilize.180 
The explanations on the difference between the estimate and the final number of 
demobilized members of the AUC vary according to which source one consults. 
According to the former commissioner of peace in the Uribe government, Luis Carlos 
Restrepo, the numbers of demobilized swelled beyond government estimates because, in 
addition to the fighters, AUC supporters and collaborators, such as drivers, suppliers, and 
informants, also sought immunity in the program.181 However, it is clear that the 
ringleaders of the AUC included gang members in cities like Medellín to inflate the 
numbers of demobilized and thus exaggerate their power and the scope of their sacrifice 
to gain further concessions from the state.182 
As in all DDR episodes, a second issue in Colombia was the number and quality 
of surrendered weapons. According to official figures of the GOC, 18,501 weapons were 
turned over by the AUC,183 which meant that only the 58 percent of those demobilizing 
gave up a weapon. That is to say, only six in every ten people within the DDR process 
surrendered a weapon. Furthermore, while some experts believed that the weapons were 
179 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or 
Transition?” 528. 
180 Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegracion, [Colombian Agency for the Reintegration], 
http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Documents/
colombia.pdf#search=reintegracion%2520en%2520colombia%253A%2520hechos%2520y%2520datos. 
181 Ivan Briscoe, Maria Derks, and Hans Rouw, “A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing 
Face of Violence in Colombia,” Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2011), 21, 
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf. 
182 OAS, “Décimo Informe del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente sobre la Misión Mapp/
Oea,” [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission], 
(Washington, 2007), 2‒4, http://fes-seguridadregional.org/
index.php?option=com_booklibrary&task=view&id=1494&catid=0&Itemid=0. 
183 Vincenç Fisas, “Introduccion al Desarme, Desmovilizacion y Reintegracion (DDR) de 
excombatientes,” [Introduction to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-
combatants], Quaderns de Construccion de Pau No 24, Escola de Cultura de Pau (Cataluna Noviembre de 
2011), http://escolapau.uab.es/img/qcp/introduccion_ddr.pdf.  
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of excellent quality,184 others claimed that, as in many DDR events, obsolete weapons 
were surrendered while the best were retained for later use. 
The numbers and quality of weapons were pale in comparison with the 
controversies over the reintegration of former combatants. According to Carlos Andrés 
Prieto, recidivist rates of former combatants were 14 percent, which formed the core of 
the Bandas Criminales, BACRIM (criminal gangs)..185 Those criminal structures quickly 
filled the vacuum left by the demobilization of the AUC to continue drug trafficking, 
kidnapping, and extortion in former territories of paramilitary presence.186 DDR merely 
transformed the threat that the AUC represented into a new security challenge. 
Unfortunately, this is an old story in the history of DDR processes that Colombia has 
experienced in its long-standing conflict. 
Why does Colombia always seem condemned to repeat its DDR failures? First, 
although Colombia has vast experience in DDR processes, the lack of resources to 
support the former combatants in their reintegration phase is a constant in the history of 
the country. The government’s support for each of the AUC demobilized consisted of 18 
to 24 months of financial support.187 That allowance was approximately $179 a month, 
which hardly offered a sufficient disincentive to join the criminal gangs that ensured a 
greater flow of income for people with experience in life outside the law. Furthermore, 
many of these fighters were taken to a collective process of DDR, which was not very 
well structured or documented. Many of them even belonged to purely drug-trafficking 
184 Spagat Michael, “Colombia’s Paramilitary DDR: Quiet and Tentative Success,” Department of 
Economics Royal Holloway, University of London and Centro de Recursos para Analisis de Conflictos 
(CERAC), 2, http://www.cerac.org.co/assets/pdf/UNDP_DDR_V1.pdf. Also Nicolas Urrutia, Miguel 
Ortega, and Gustavo Andrade, “Rastreo de Armas: Perspectivas sobre control, Trafico y Uso de Armas 
Ilegales en Colombia,” [Tracking of Weapons: Perspectives on Control, Traffic and Use of Illegal Weapons 
in Colombia], Fundacion Ideas para la Paz and Universiteit Gent (Bogota, Colombia: November 2009), 
https://biblio.ugent.be/input/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=909955&fileOId=910000. 
185 Carlos Andrés Prieto, “Las Bacrim y el Crimen Organizado en Colombia,” [BACRIM and 
Syndicated Crime in Colombia], Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (March 2013), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
bueros/la-seguridad/09714.pdf, 3. 
186 OAS, “Décimo Informe Del Secretario General Al Consejo Permanente Sobre La Misión Mapp/
Oea,” [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission]. 
187 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or 
Transition?” 528. 
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structures, not the AUC per se. The demobilized who had belonged to these structures 
simply returned to, or continued, their old criminal activities.188 
2. Guiding Principles  
In order to understand in a more detailed fashion the DDR process of the AUC, 
with its strengths and weaknesses, one must consider the assumptions made by the 
various actors. President Uribe adopted DDR as a central pillar of his security policy. He 
put in place reforms, not only within the state bureaucracy, but also led legislative 
initiatives to provide legal tools to advance the process of DDR of the AUC. Luis Carlos 
Restrepo, a man who enjoyed Uribe’s confidence, was appointed High Commissioner for 
Peace, with a clear mission to carry out a successful conclusion of the DDR process. 
For its part, most of the AUC leaders agreed to participate in the DDR for reasons 
stated above, and so ordered their “blocks” to surrender their weapons. However, the 
AUC was rife with disputes over control of drug trafficking which resulted in an internal 
war that saw the death of AUC leader Carlos Castaño.189 Even as they demobilized, some 
AUC leaders continued to pursue their criminal activities. In light of these blatant 
violations of the DDR agreements and the law, Uribe decided to extradite 12 paramilitary 
leaders to the United States on May 13, 2008. 
Extradition revealed the lack of an adequate legal framework for the process of 
DDR. The issue of justice for former fighters and leaders of the AUC, rather than their 
simple demobilization, represented a failure in the planning of the GOC to deal with the 
process. Because of concerns about AUC criminals walking away free, Law 975 (the 
Law of Justice and Peace) was passed by Congress in 2005 as the process drew to a 
close.190 The foregoing was due to the differences in the GOC itself and the “Uribista 
coalition (party of President Uribe), on the level of impunity that the GOC could be 
188 OAS, “Décimo Informe Del Secretario General Al Consejo Permanente Sobre La Misión Mapp/
Oea,” [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission]. 
189 On April 16, 2004, Carlos Castano was killed under his same brother’s orders. The main 
hypothesis about that crime is that the deceased paramilitary leader had been talking with U.S. authorities 
in order to submit himself to U.S. justice.  
190 Briscoe, Derks, and Rouw, “A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in 
Colombia,” 19. 
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granted to the demobilized.”191 Why this was overlooked? Any possible answer is 
confusing, because one of the primary concerns of President Uribe was not to offer full 
amnesty to the demobilized, as had happened in the processes of the 1980s and 1990s  
To make sure that the international community ratified the process, the GOC 
invited the Organization of American States to act as a guarantor of the process. This 
required the creation of MAPP OEA.192 In 2004, OAS established, according its mandate 
No 1397, the Mision para Apoyar el Proceso de Paz de Colombia (MAPP) as the 
Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia. The main objectives of the OAS 
mission in Colombia included: 1) “assisting that country in the field of verification and 
counseling in the process of demobilization and reintegration of the illegal armed 
groups;”193 and 2) “accompanying peace efforts emanating from institutions and 
communities.”194 While MAPP OEA was integral to the process, though, it acted as an 
observer in the name of the international community, not as an active part of the DDR 
process. 
To give coherence and continuity to the DDR of the AUC, the High 
Commissioner for Peace tackled the process in three phases for all the structures of the 
AUC throughout the country. The first phase consisted of “awareness-raising and 
preparation for demobilization of the ex-combatants.”195 The second phase assembled 
AUC combatants at demobilization sites, while the third phase consisted in the formal 
demobilization and the start of the reintegration process.196 All the stages were supported 
by the Comite Operativo para la Dejacion de Armas (CODA), which supervised the 
surrender of arms. CODA was comprised of one representative of each of the ministries 
of the Interior, Justice, Defense, Family Welfare, the Public Prosecutor’s office, and 
191 Marco Palacios, Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010, 172. 
192 OAS, Mision para Apoyar el Proceso de Paz de Colombia (MAPP), Mission to Support the Peace 
Process in Colombia. MAPP http://www.mapp-oea.net/documentos/resoluciones/resolucion859.pdf. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid. 




                                                 
Attorney General.197 CODA’s task was to oversee disarmament of the combatants and to 
verify their status. The office of the Commissioner of Peace could start the process of 
reintegration only after have received CODA’s confirmation that each demobilized 
combatant had been certified. 
While the DDR of the AUC was incorporated into the overall framework of 
democratic security, the GOC failed to foresee a situation that left vacuums of 
governance in those areas of paramilitary presence, a situation that gave rise to the 
emergence of the BACRIMS.198 Furthermore, the resources invested in the reintegration 
processes failed to meet the needs and expectations of the former combatants. As already 
mentioned, for some demobilized AUC members it made more sense to enter the then-
nascent criminal gangs, which meant that cases of murder and extortion in some areas of 
the country were actually increased by DDR. 
C. INDIVIDUAL DDR  
Beginning in 2002, military pressure of the GOC became increasingly intense on 
the FARC and the ELN. This was the result of the increased number of troops, 
equipment, and supplies available to the Armed Forces, as well as targeted intelligence. 
President Uribe created this advantageous situation by obtaining greater resources from 
new taxes, and because of increased military aid from the United States. These military 
operations convinced many guerrilla fighters that the easy victories over the Colombian 
Army during days of the despeje had closed, and they needed to demobilize if they 
wanted to live. Although officially the stages of demobilization and disarmament of the 
AUC had already finished, individual DDR had continued with an accelerated pace of 
individual guerrillas demobilized. This process reached its peak between 2002 and 2010 
to include close to the 20,000 demobilized guerrillas.199 
197 Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Presidential 
Decree number 128 on January 2008. 
198 OAS, “Décimo Informe Del Secretario General Al Consejo Permanente Sobre La Misión Mapp/
Oea,” [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission]. 
199 ACR and CMSC, “Desarme, Desmovilizacion y Reintegracion DDR en Colombia: Lecciones 
Aprendidas y Resultados del Proceso 2002‒2010,” [Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegracion 
(DDR) in Colombia: Lessons Learned and Results of the Process 2002‒2010] (Bogota: July 2010), 123. 
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The individual DDR process makes demobilized fighters eligible for the benefits 
like a stipend and retraining as preparation for reinsertion into civilian life. That is the 
biggest difference between the processes of DDR in the 1980s and 1990s and the current 
individual DDR process. With this condition clearly established, the GOC in 2006 
created the Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegracion, or Colombian Agency for 
Reintegration (ACR). The ACR replaced the Programa para la Reincorporacion a la 
Vida Civil (PRVC), which had been established in 2002. These changes were not merely 
cosmetic but also aimed to link the demobilized with the community. 
1. Stages of the Process 
The process of individual DDR in Colombia falls under the Ministry of Defense. 
The person interested in demobilization applies to any authority—judicial, civil, or even 
religious. This authority alerts the local unit of the Armed Forces which transfers the 
person to the CODA. At the start of the demobilization phase, the applicant is subject to 
verification by the CODA, which confirms that the individual indeed belongs to an illegal 
group. Once a person is certified, he or she makes a transition to the ACR.200 
In the ACR, the former combatant initiates “the path of reintegration, which is the 
way that each participant in a process guided by the ACR must travel fully to reintegrate 
into social and economic life.”201 This process consists of coordinating, between the 
ACR and the demobilized, a reintegration plan within that will lead to a legal existence. 
2. Guiding Principles  
As an ongoing process executed over a long period that covers several 
governments in Colombia, it is interesting to analyze the individual DDR process through 
the guiding principles described by Ball and van de Goor. This analysis will assess the 
strengths and flaws of Colombia’s DDR process. In the light of the first principle, 
200 With information from Programa de Atencion Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD), [Program 
of Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilized], “Desarme, Desmovilización, y Reintegración,” 
[Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)], Ministry of National Defense of Colombia, 
(power point presentation Bogota, Colombia, July, 2014). 
201 With information from Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegracion de la Presidencia de Colombia, 
Colombian Agency for the Reintegration, “Ruta de Reintegración,” [Route of Reintegration], 
http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Paginas/ruta.aspx. 
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national leadership and responsibility, we can see that the process has been a constant in 
the history of Colombia. Since the Government of Belisario Betancur (1982–1986), most 
of the Colombian presidents have enacted decrees to encourage individual DDR. 
However, only in the first Government of Uribe (2002–2006) did individual DDR 
become a real strategy in the counterinsurgency fight, with resources, including 
legislation and administrative support, to back it up.   
Next, the process of individual DDR has been subjected to constant revisions to 
adapt it to the evolving requirements of recognition of victim rights, and with 
international standards of truth, justice, and reparation. However, they have produced 
meager results on this front, and virtually all the offenses committed by combatants 
remain unpunished. One of the main reasons for this impunity is that demobilization 
would not be attractive to the guerrillas if they were to face prison time. 
The third principle of DDR—that it is part of a broader policy of security rather 
than treated as a stand-alone—has been a constant under Uribe; however, it is necessary 
that the GOC made greater efforts to prevent recruitment of minors into guerrillas. 
Despite the high number of demobilized, the guerrillas continue to maintain a force 
greater than the 7,000 men in arms.202 The number of combatants still represents a real 
threat for the consolidation of the state in large areas of Colombia. 
The fourth principle requires one to learn from past practices. The GOC has made 
great strides and has successfully implemented an entire organizational structure with 
well-established protocols to meet the changing needs of DDR. Nevertheless, resources 
remain scarce. The COG has also been transparent about its DDR process, inviting the 
international community to play an observer role within processes. 
D. THE GOVERNMENT OF JUAN MANUEL SANTOS 
The government of President Juan Manuel Santos (August 2010–present) has 
given continuity to the DDR process within the GOC’s counterinsurgency strategy. 
202 Juan Guillermo Mercado, “Desmovilización, principal arma contra las guerrillas,” 
[Demobilization, Main Weapon against the Guerrillas], El Tiempo, September 23, 2013, 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13077339. 
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According to statistics from the Grupo de Atencion Humanitaria al Desmovilizado 
(GAHD), 5,595 guerrillas have embraced the benefits of the individual DDR since 2010. 
According to the GAHD, 84.1 percent of those demobilized belonged to the FARC, while 
14.4 percent are former members of the ELN.203 
Should the ongoing peace talks in Havana between the GOC and the FARC prove 
successful, one may witness the collective demobilization of the FARC. However, one 
impediment to collective DDR is Law 1148, better known in Colombia as the Law of 
Victims. Passed in June 2011, this law requires the Colombian State to provide “care and 
comprehensive reparation to the victims of the internal armed conflict.”204 In addition, 
the Law of Victims has a strong component of land restitution, the central axis of the 
Colombian conflict. This law sought to create a space for national reconciliation by 
recognizing the victims, regardless of the origin of the victimizers. It is very important to 
stress that the Victims’ Law contains a full section, the seventh, devoted exclusively to 
“comprehensive protection for children and adolescents victims.”205 
In the same way, president Santos passed the Legislative Act 01 of 2012 or the 
Marco Juridico para la Paz, a legal framework for peace.206 That act corresponds to the 
implementation of a new model on demobilization of the GOC. Act 01 was driven in 
order to advance the demobilization of the insurgent groups that persist within the 
Colombian conflict, FARC and ELN. Within the act, GOC established:  
1) The possibility to classify and prioritize the various offences so that the 
Judicial Branch to focus on the investigation and punishment of those who 
had the greatest responsibility in the occurrence of extreme events; 2) the 
legislator may order the waiving of the criminal prosecution of the cases 
that are not selected or prioritized; 3) members of armed groups outside 
203 With information from the Programa de Asistencia Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD), 
[Program of Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilized], from the Ministry of National Defense of 
Colombia. 
204 Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Ley 1448 de 
2011 (Law 1448, 2011), http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Leyes/Documents/ley144810062011.pdf. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Acto 




                                                 
the law to demobilize may gain access to posts of popular election and be 
appointed as public servants.207 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The main innovation of the processes of DDR, both collective and individual, is 
that they performed in the absence of formal peace negotiations between illegally armed 
groups and the GOC. However, by taking that route, GOC was faced with situations that 
demonstrated amateurism, inexperience, and a lack of planning, as happened with the 
DDR of the AUC. During that DDR process, the legal framework to accommodate the 
combatants, the Justice and Peace Law, was adopted almost at the end of the formal 
demobilization of the combatants. This situation created enormous loopholes and 
injustices in the demobilization of the AUC, especially those that de-legitimized the 
process. The DDR of the AUC also revealed inconsistencies about the number of 
demobilized and the quantity and quality of weapons surrendered. For that reason, it is 
necessary that GOC implement more efficient mechanisms to identify people who seek 
benefits from the process of DDR. In its haste to demobilize, the state must guard against 
becoming a victim of deception with the surrender of obsolete weapons. 
Individual DDR, revitalized during the first term of Uribe’s presidency, continues 
to prove an effective strategy as more than 20,000 combatants, the vast majority of them 
FARC, have preferred to abandon weapons and qualify for the benefits of DDR. 
Nevertheless, the big question is, why after more than 12 years of implementation has the 
process not reached its culminating point of victory? The guerrilla groups managed to 
replace their losses to DDR with few problems and continue to pose a significant menace 
in some areas, while the GOC continues to resource a strategy that fails to contribute to 
state security. Indeed, many demobilized complain that they lack the resources to 
reintegrate successfully into Colombian society, while taxpayers resent having to pay to 
rehabilitate former bad actors. This is likely to become a significant issue should the 
negotiations in Havana prove successful, causing the GOC to pay the costs of 
reintegrating literally thousands of guerrillas. Santos’ ambitions to end the conflict in 
207 Universidad de los Andes, “Marco Legal para la Paz,” [Legal Framework for Peace], Congreso 
Visible, Proyectos de Ley, http://congresovisible.org/proyectos-de-ley/por-medio-del-cual-se/6437/. 
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Colombia may have outrun its resources, although the counter argument is that it is 
cheaper to feed a guerrilla than to try to kill him.   
The budget considerations are not the only concerns of Colombians. According to 
many scholars, the primary concern is that the collective DDR of the FARC, like that of 
the AUC, will simply swell Colombia’s significant criminal underworld. The fear is not 
unfounded; on the contrary, the intelligence agencies of Colombia have fully documented 
the existing contacts between members of the FARC guerillas and the BACRIM. A 
FARC-BACRIM alliance, in addition to casting doubts on the desire for peace of some 
FARC leaders, leads also to consider the possible transformation of guerrilla fronts into 
dangerous criminal gangs. Unfortunately, several of the members of those fronts may 
choose drug trafficking over reintegration via DDR. 
Finally, in Havana over the coming months, the GOC and FARC will discuss the 
process of DDR of the guerrilla group. By that time, Colombians, and the international 
community, will discover whether Colombia actually has learned the DDR lessons, and 




At the time of this writing, peace talks between the GOC and the FARC have 
entered their third year in Havana with no clear end in sight. The parties have reached an 
agreement on three issues of the original agenda—political participation, the problem of 
combating drugs, and access to land. However, two aspects remain: DDR and victim 
compensation, which will require significant compromises by both parties to gain the 
approbation of the entire country and bring negotiations to a successful conclusion. The 
most recent statements by the FARC in Havana have cast uncertainty over whether a 
process of DDR can be agreed. The FARC’s opening position is that this process should 
include both the Colombian Army and the FARC, with the guerrilla group retaining its 
weapons.208  
Given the significant Colombia’s 60-year experience with DDR, this thesis does 
not predict failure. One is allowed to take inspiration from other successful cases of 
DDR, such as those of El Salvador and South Africa, both of which provide valuable 
lessons to guide the GOC, which has updated its legislation and administrative 
procedures to accommodate a potential DDR of FARC. The institutions created—mainly 
ACR and PAHD—combine significant experience in both collective and individual 
DDR, in a manner that ensures that the lessons of earlier processes at least are taken into 
account should the FARC demobilize. 
The Colombian legislation on DDR has been updated and adapted to evolving 
conditions, both to the Colombian conflict and the latest international trends in regard to 
human rights, transitional justice, and reparations. This adaptation in itself has proved to 
be a source of instability as successive presidents have made changes to the Colombian 
legal codes during their respective mandates. Furthermore, demands for post-conflict 
justice may actually prove an impediment to DDR. Although it is not clear yet what 
possible role the International Criminal Court, of which Colombia is a signatory, would 
208 Noticias RCN, “Las Farc reiteran que no entregarán armas una vez que se firme la paz,” [The 
FARC Reiterated Do Not Give up Arms once the Peace is Signed], http://www.noticiasrcn.com/nacional-
pais/las-farc-reiteran-no-entregaran-armas-una-vez-se-firme-paz. 
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play in prosecuting crimes against humanity; that body is on record as saying that the 
FARC leadership should face trial.209 Furthermore, the U.S. government also seeks to 
prosecute the ringleaders of the FARC for crimes against American citizens as well as 
drug-related crimes.  
Current programs, most notably the individual DDR processes mainly of FARC 
guerrillas that have been in place for over a decade, offer hope for success of a 
generalized agreement. However, one cannot be blind to the fact that there are multiple 
actors in the Colombian conflict, any of whom may threaten to derail the process with the 
FARC. This situation was present also in South Africa. With this in mind, this thesis will 
conclude in two sections. First, the findings in the different processes of DDR, both in 
Colombia, El Salvador, and South Africa are important, because they point to potential 
pitfalls in the DDR of the FARC.210 The actors involved, the issue of human rights, the 
diverse stages of the process, and principles to apply in DDR processes are aspects that 
demand the upmost attention of the parties successfully to complete a DDR process. 
Second, it is important that GOC deploy preventive actions211 at the first sign of 
systemic breakdown of the process. Preventive action is especially important because of 
Colombia’s history of the transformation and mutation of political violence at the end of 
each peace process. As this thesis has noted, something similar also happened in El 
Salvador and South Africa at the time of DDR implementation. 
A. WARNING SIGNALS 
1. In accordance with analyses in the different cases referred to in this thesis, 
the signing of peace agreements does not automatically end hostilities. On 
the contrary, immediately after the peace treaty was signed and the DDR 
program agreed upon, political violence and violations of human rights 
actually increased. The reasons for this are several, but may spring from 
the implementation of a total amnesty for the combatants, which generates 
a feeling of powerlessness and thirst for revenge in the victims. Also, 
209 El Nuevo Siglo, “CPI Podría Actuar si Cabecillas de las Farc no Van a la Cárcel,” [ICJ Might Act 
if Leaders of the FARC Do Not Go to Jail], October 29, 2014, http://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/
10-2014-cpi-podr%C3%ADa-actuar-si-cabecillas-de-las-farc-no-van-la-cárcel.html. 
210 Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 33. 
211 Ibid., 33. 
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DDR creates power vacuums in a country that former combatants may 
struggle to fill. 
2. DDR must include all of the actors within the conflict in order to reach 
lost lasting peace. Otherwise, the GOC runs the risk that the factions left 
to one side become spoilers who can derail the DDR process. 
3. Reintegration programs become the Achilles heel of the DDR processes in 
the cases studied. Demobilized combatants complain about the paucity of 
assistance received, which falls short of expectations when they laid down 
their arms. Disappointment, even a sense of betrayal, becomes fertile 
ground for criminal organizations that arise to fill the void of legitimacy 
with violence and illegality in the wake of DDR. When these 
organizations have illegal connections and resources in other countries, as 
is the case of the FARC, the risk of transformation into a criminal 
organization increases. Furthermore, the DDR process should have 
protocols for the identification of bona fide combatants who are members 
of the insurgent structures, and exclude ordinary criminals or opportunists 
who want to take advantage of DDR for their own gain. The absence of 
such a process helped to discredit and undermine the DDR of the AUC 
between 2003 and 2006, and contributed to the emergence of the 
BACRIM. 
B. PREVENTIVE ACTIONS 
1. The GOC has updated its legislation in regards to transitional justice and 
victim reparation. However, the GOC cannot repeat the mistakes of the 
past to grant a blanket amnesty to future demobilized. The Colombian 
population is very skeptical about a hypothetical amnesty to the FARC. 
For this reason, combatants who have committed crimes against 
humanity should be tried and punished for their misconduct. That 
measure would increase the legitimacy of the process, not only in the 
view of the Colombian population, but also to the international 
community. In addition, it is necessary to ensure equal treatment before 
the law in a general manner to all persons who have committed crimes, 
including members of the Armed Forces.212 Justice may also be 
undermined if, in the course of the Havana negotiations, the GOC may 
grant seats in parliament to a future FARC political party, as this may 
grant them immunity from prosecution or provide them with a vehicle to 
sabotage legislatively the natural course of justice.213 GOC must apply 
212 In Colombia recently Major General (R) Arias Cabrales was sentenced to 35 years in prison for his 
alleged involvement in the disappearance of hostages in the recovery operation of the Palace of Justice after 
the bloody socket of the M19. In the meantime, the former members of the group enjoy total amnesty and 
some of its leaders are now senators and mayors. 
213 Ana Maria Montoya, “Colombians’ Views of the FARC as a Political Party,” Americas Barometer 
Insights: 2014, no. 117, (Vanderbilt University), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO907en.pdf. 
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the fourth principle of the successful DDR processes: learn from past 
experience. Colombia must not repeat the errors of previous DDR 
processes, which are still a source of contention in Colombian society. 
2. Although the GOC has initiated an exploratory dialogue with the ELN, 
there has been no official notification at the time of writing that the ELN 
has agreed to become part of the Havana process. Demobilizing one 
insurgent group for the benefit of another will not bring peace. Likewise, 
the GOC should view the DDR of the FARC as part of a broader security 
strategy (the third principle of DDR) that also takes into consideration the 
problem of BACRIM. It would be self-defeating if demobilized FARC 
fighters simply enlist in the BACRIM. A comprehensive approach would 
be an important step in breaking the cycle of perpetuation or mutation of 
violence after each process of DDR in Colombia. 
3. The FARC is estimated at present to have around 7,500 guerrillas under 
arms. These are the people that DDR should target, not the opportunistic 
looking for money or legal benefits derived from the agreements; (b) the 
benefits of the DDR process must be made sufficiently attractive to the 
demobilized so that they do not simply transition to the BACRIM. (c) 
The GOC must occupy the spaces vacated by the DDR of the FARC so 
that they will not merely be filled with other non-state actors. (d) To meet 
the policy objectives of DDR, the funds for the reintegration of the FARC 
must be obtained in collaboration with the international community. 
Otherwise, the risk is that funds will be inadequate to guarantee the full 
reintegration of combatants. This could have catastrophic consequences 
for the stability of the country. (e) Mechanisms for cooperation should be 
established with the countries of Central and South America to prevent 
likely dissident groups of the FARC from establishing themselves in 
these countries, either as armed groups or to create financial, arms 
trafficking, or illegal drug havens. Should this happen, these countries 
would face a threat of instability. The last thing that Colombia desires to 
achieve with DDR is to infect its neighbors with the same problems that 
have plagued Bogota for the last 60 years. 
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